The Return of History and the End of Dreams Reviews

• "Back To The Future"

  
  By A2IG2FG7L85RMU on 2008-05-02
  Robert Kagan's "The Return of History And The End Of Dreams" is a sobering, trenchantly written analysis of contemporary international affairs. In it, Kagan takes aim at the largely unwarranted optimism widespread in western democracies following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Many at that time thought the world had arrived at "the end of history," that the future would be confined to one inevitable shape (liberal democracy), that nations in the wake of a new geo-economics and globalization would now just peacefully engage in commerce, with nationalism and geo-political confrontation things of the past.
  
  Kagan looks at the current scene without such blinkers, reminding his readers of the competitive nature of human beings and of the "stubborn traditions" now once again clearly resurgent in many nation states. Far from presenting a world in which the triumph of liberal democracy is inevitable, he draws attention to the resurgence of its increasingly powerful rivals, autocracy (in Russia and China principally) and to a lesser degree Islamist radicalism (in the Middle East). In short, Kagan reveals the allegedly post-modern world to be a place where power politics still obtains and war is not out of court. The post-Cold War world, then, should be understood as one containing a large measure of "backward-looking" geo-political competition, and that the great conflict now taking shape within it, if one has the courage to see, is the one between democracy and autocracy.
  
  Following his demolition of the simple faith in a new international liberal order presumably automatic upon the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kagan goes on to call the western democracies to a new vigilance. As he puts it, "the future international order will be shaped by those who have the power and the collective will to shape it. The question is whether the world's democracies will again rise to that challenge."
  
  

• Liberal Democracy vs Autocracy

  
  By A3H86VWLHHG96C on 2008-05-16
  During the 1990s, after the fall of communism, it appeared that democratic capitalism had triumphed with no serious ideological challengers on the horizon. It was famously designated by Francis Fukuyama as "the end of history." Enlightenment had reached its final stage, there was no longer any beyond toward which progress marched. Most of the pundit class believed that China and Russia were well on their way to becoming liberal democracies. The theory was that once their respective middle classes reached a certain level of wealth they would be demanding the legal and political rights that are required of constitutional liberalism.
  
  Robert Kagan does not believe this will happen. Autocracies such as China and Russia will not make the transition to liberal democracy on their own, nor will they change if they are safely embedded in the international liberal order. Kagan argues that the Chinese and the Russians do not view democracy as competitive elections, rather elections are something that asserts the popular will, which becomes the will of the ruling class. The ruling classes are not so much concerned with human rights as they are with satisfying public needs. In both countries a relatively small ruling class controls all the levers of power. Even though they line their own pockets, they have served their populations rather well, compared to the kleptocrats of smaller autocracies. The majorities of their populations actually seem content with this "style" of democracy.
  
  Fareed Zakaria has argued in The Post-American World that autocracies do not hold beliefs other than becoming part of the global economy. They are simply pragmatists who will eventually become stakeholders in the system. Kagan begs to differ: He writes that autocrats believe in autocracy and will continue to reject the demands of meddlesome Western governments and NGOs. The higher cause they believe in is that they are providing economic success for their people and by extension getting international respect.
  
  Autocracies seek to make the world safe for other autocracies as well. Their so-called respect for other nations' sovereignty and policy of noninterference sits well with lesser dictatorships such as Myanmar and North Korea. Autocrats prefer to do business with each other. After the successes of democracy in the 1990s, Russia and China would like to roll back those advances by promoting thier own successes. Kagan thinks that only dreamers would believe that China and Russia could become part of the liberal international order.
  
  Interestingly enough, one of the most provocative and consequential foreign policy statements made by John McCain was in Kagan's neoconservative mold. McCain proposed that international organizations should only allow democracies as its members, as in a league of democracies, setting themselves against such countries as China and Russia. This would be the end of dreams and possibly the beginning of a nightmare. Although Kagan's point is well argued, I am more inclined the agree with Zakaria in that greater efforts should be made to make these important players part of the system rather than enemies of the system. The ideology of autocracy is inherently weak because power is too concentrated. Better to weaken it from within.
  
  

• KAGAN IS THE PATRON SAINT OF NEO-CONS

  
  By A155HW1W8ZZZ47 on 2008-05-27
  Robert Kagan is trying to sell books by playing off the title of Fukuyama's End of History. He does not rise to the intellect of Fukuyama nor does he make any reasonable argument in support of his contention that, indeed, the ideological struggle has returned. For reasons set forth below, authors like Robert Kagan, funded by think tanks funded by defense contractors, should be avoided. His misjudgments in the Iraq context has caused the death of thousands of Americans and it is simply inappropriate for Knopf to give a book contract to someone so silly so soon. He regurgitates some of the great lines of political economy, so if you want to collect quotes, the book may be worth it for that.
  
  Yes Russia, China and India have increased their defense budget, and are all nuclear. Yes also, countries which grow economically independent tend to become more assertive upon doing so. Yes also, that humans have foibles and ego and all that. So what is the point writing a book telling us about it. Well, the author thinks all that points to the resurgence of new challenges, and although he does not say so, probably means a bigger defense budget and more surveilance stateside, all the things he has argued for as a leading neo-con.
  
  Unfornately what neo-cons have never understood is why the world seems to be moving away from the goodwill of the early nineties and toward more tension. First, it is because neo-cons overestimated the positive vibes then, just as they overestimate the negative vibes now. When Bush and Bill kristol and Robert Kagan were trumping the new relationship with Russia and Putin, he was in China and India openly talking about a strategic alliance against the US. So Kagan missed that then, and now he is crying foul when the reality of Putin has come through.
  
  Two, Kagan misses in his book the single biggest irritant in international relations. Yes, I do not mean to beat up the US, but it is neo-con foreign policy. You have put American soldiers in Afgahnistan and Iraq, so Iran now is surrounded on both sides by them. If it seems to be upping the ante, it is because its own survival is at stake.
  
  Then there is Russian. Neo-cons have put NATO right on the Russian border and want to put all manner of surveilance equipment right there. There is no reason why Russians should be expected to put up with it, especially since conservatives came up with the idea of auctioning off the assets of the Soviet Union and thus turned over the patrimony of 200 million people into the hands of 20 oligarchs. No, it is not the free market way. Capitalism means taking a pick ax to Montana and digging your silver mine. What happened in Russia was the oligarchs, conservative professors from the US and neo-con strategists turned over for 2 cents a dollar those assets already developed.
  
  Three, men like Robert Kagan should leave political economy to Gilpin and Fukuyama who although not private sector people, so at least have some handle on the 'geoeconomics' Robert Kagan was trying to write about.
  
  Finally, Robert Kagan most reminds me of the Iraq War. And it is simply inappropriate that a man of his strategic ineptitude should continue to find space on bookstore shelves.
  
  

• Chaos rules, democracy survives, all the rest cause trouble

  
  By A3KHRGGS52HE8O on 2008-05-24
  Brilliant; history has not ended, it is alive and well and in most part ignoring and even rejecting the "exceptionalism" of America and writers such as Fukuyama.
  
  In brief, Kagan presents the logical facts about why international turmoil will continue unabated. Yet, he's still stuck in the idealism of Kant and Montesquieu who argued, "The natural effect of commerce is to lead toward peace."
  
  But, commerce is competition which becomes riddled with cheating and bullying. From steroids in sports to bribes in business, competition leads to cheating which leads to fisticuffs and, when enough people are involved, to war. Kagan astutely recognizes the ills of the last century; he doesn't sumble until he gets to the future.
  
  This may be the most relevant book issued this election year. One of it's central ideas is already part of Sen. John McCain's campaign platform, and an issue for discussion in the Financial Times. Ignore Kagan's sense of reality and Bush's blundering bozos will look like picnickers playing in the park compared to what comes next.
  
  "In a world increasingly divided among democratic and autocratic lines, the world's democrats will have to stick together," Kagan advises. It's a proposal McCain has voiced with his 'League of Democracies'. Kagan likely originated it; McCain copied, which at least shows he's capable of recognizing good ideas.
  
  Yet, there's another "reality". At this point (May 2008), Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton can't form a 'League of Two Democrats' let alone two democracies. Many Republicans have a similar problem in forming a "league" to elect McCain.
  
  What does it prove? It proves life is challenged more by chaos than by all the clever philosophies from Plato to Kagan, who writes, ". . . they regarded democracy as the rule of the licentious, greedy, and ignorant mob".
  
  They were right. Now it's called chaos. Success is the ability to recognize useful patterns within chaos. The world is not an orderly formula which everyone obeys, like some "Universal Theory" Albert Einstein sought so vainly. It's chaos, confusion, conflict and contusion which the wise learn to analyze and the foolish continue to lament.
  
  Aye, there's the rub. How do you implement perceptive insights and good ideas in a world of chaos?
  
  Kagan goes right up to this point, then hesitates rather than plunge into uncertainty. He's an American idealist, ready to build the 'city on a hill' as the perfect answer, a man governed by reason, inspired by perfection but somewhat above reality.
  
  It is a brilliant essay. It's as current as this year's U.S. elections, as timeless as history itself and as relevant as anything else you may read this year.
  
  But, chaos rules. You'll understand after reading this book.
  
  
  
  
  

• Poorly-written, historically weak - and, worst of all, yet more warmongering

  
  By A1S60W4KWFX1Y9 on 2008-06-06
  Robert Kagan worked in the US State Department from 1984 to 1998, and was a co-founder of the Project for the New American Century (PNAC). He has written this little book in reply to Francis Fukuyama, also of the State Department and of PNAC, who in 1992 wrote `The End Of History And The Last Man'.
  
  This book may be Kagan's application for the post of foreign policy advisor to Republican presidential candidate Senator John McCain. Among other brilliant ideas, McCain wants Britain to invade Sudan, just like we did in the 1880s. Remember what happened to General Gordon? And to the government that sent him?
  
  Kagan wants whatever he calls democracies to unite against what he calls autocracies, especially China and Russia. But actually he wants empires, US and EU alike, to unite against national sovereignty.
  
  He defines democracy as having competitive elections. But in the USA, the electoral choice is between two wings of the Property Party, two multi-millionaires, equally pro-capital, equally pro-empire (witness Obama's pledges, like McCain's, to back whatever the Israeli state does, to eliminate the so-called threat from Iran and to tighten the USA's illegal blockade of Cuba). Are Russia's elections, or Iran's, or Venezuela's, significantly less democratic that the USA's? Yet Kagan calls these countries autocracies.
  
  Kagan notes that the American people want the USA to play a less prominent world role, but he doesn't let that stop him calling for more globalisation, more capitalism. But the peoples of the world need to determine their own countries' futures, free from outside interference.
  
  He approvingly quotes Blair's adviser Robert Cooper, who says that the EU is a `cooperative empire ... dedicated to liberty and democracy' - so free and so democratic that it refuses its citizens a vote on its treaties. Not surprising, given that Cooper believes, "The challenge to the postmodern world is to get used to the idea of double standards."
  
  Remember that in 1914, Germany's franchise was wider than Britain's, yet the British and US states called the First World War a war for democracy against German autocracy. Kagan, as a servant of his empire, says that it must fight and defeat the `autocracies' - he is just another warmonger. Here he continues his ten-year campaign for attacking Iraq, claiming that Iraq may join a bloc of pro-US democracies in the Middle East. The end of dreams?
  
  
  
• Good Observation, Inadequate Vision
  By A3KDGJX43RU5MK on 2008-06-09
  Robert Kagan deserves credit for recognizing certain realities. The world remains complicated and dangerous more than a decade after the Soviet Union fell. Nationalism and religious fanaticism remain. Many people now doubt the merits of Globalization. Francis Fukuyama erred in predicting the end of history back then, though I don't see that Kagan is really attacking Fukuyama, other than in the title. Clinton also erred in declaring an end to the era of big government. We are not on a deterministic path to democratic capitalism.
  
  Somebody needed to write this book. The fact of the matter is that democracy and capitalism were historicaly uncommon forms of social organization back when the USSR keeled over. The same is true today. Of course, one can still argue that people are better off with capitalism and democracy. This is why somebody needs to write another book. Kagan is no visionary. He makes many observations about the way things are, and that is fine. But it is more important to think about how things could and should be.
  
  To put it simply, excessive focus on the way the world is kills any chance for progress. Of course, the pursuit of unrealizable goals led to the disasters of the 20th century. But I do not think that the global order envisioned by Fukuyama (and by Hayek) has been proven unrealizable. Perhaps Kagan should now turn his attention to how we might avoid the international conflict and tension that he correctly observes. This is not to say that he has no opinions to offer. But he does not offer any sort of fundamental change to deal with the situations he observes. His call for world democracies to unite against autocracies could be as much a source for escalation of global problems as a cure. Perhaps we should not give up on dreaming just yet.
  
  
• A snapshot of global politics, 2008
  By A2SMLMZWMPNPKK on 2008-06-01
  Although the title clearly references Fukuyama's book, it's important to point out that Kagan isn't attacking Fukuyama here. Just in the same way that The End of History was a product of the end of the Cold War, The Return of History is the product of the world in 2008. Kagan's book is much less ambitious in the sense that Fukuyama really went out on a limb with his book and made a lot of predictions. While the fall of the Soviet Union undoubtedly remains one of history's most monumental events, time has not been kind to Fukuyama's argument.
  
  The central thesis to Kagan's book is that great power politics and nationalistic ambitions did not die with the Soviet Union. Russia under Putin, China, and other autocracies stand opposite the U.S., Europe and other democracies in a struggle for dominance of the international system. Making a reference to Huntington, Kagan argues it is not a country's "civilization" that determines its path, but rather its form of government. Russia and China reach out to and reinforce autocratic governments regardless of where in the world they are, just as many East European and Asian democracies align themselves with the U.S. and Europe.
  
  In just over 100 pages, Kagan produces a spot-on analysis of the world in mid-2008. He doesn't offer up sweeping predictions or theories, but rather a snapshot of sorts. One of the most interesting aspects of this book is looking at how Kagan's thinking has evolved since his last brief book, Of Paradise and Power. In that book, he spoke of the differences between the U.S. and Europe that were very pronounced during the lead up to the Iraq war. It's clear that Kagan is capable of providing informed and relevant analysis of world events as they constantly change. I'll be sure to read anything he produces in the future.
  
  
• The Malignity of Multipolarity
  By A1RJD10TTI568L on 2008-07-18
  This is a perceptive and far-sighted examination on the state of global politics as the decade approaches its end, in the form of an extended essay. A new axis of evil is rising in opposition to the West, one not guided by a shared ideology except in so far as hostility to the rule of law and democracy might be considered ideological. Kagan predicts that the future will see the return of nationalism, growing tensions and confrontation between the forces of democracy and autocracy. What matters is a nation's nature of government, he observes, not its culture, religion or geographic location; and this will determine its international alignment. While not dismissing the terrorist threat, he does not consider it a primary menace as history proves that modernity has never lost against the traditionalism represented by the Islamists. True, but terrorism might have unintended consequences in the formation of alliances and the development of state structures.
  
  It is interesting to compare Kagan's analysis with Margaret Thatcher's Statecraft, published in 2002, in which she assessed the state of the world and possible future trajectories. In chapters 3 and 4 of her book Thatcher looks at Russia and the Asian Giants China (including Taiwan and Hong Kong) and India. Rogue states, religion and terrorism are discussed in chapter 6, with particular reference to North Korea, Islam, Iraq, Syria, Libya and Iran. Another must-read: The New Cold War: Putin's Russia and the Threat to the West by Edward Lucas, already confirms Kagan's view. Russia is pursuing policies that threaten its own citizens, neighboring states and the world at large. Lucas takes a hard look at the ruling elite which emerged almost entirely from the ranks of the old KGB. This dominant class harbors resentment against the West as a whole in an interesting parallel to the hostility of the Brussels Eurocracy towards the USA and Israel. The Russian government now openly competes with the West on the economic and political fronts.
  
  Freedom of expression and the rule of law exist in name only; the state controls all the economic activity, political institutions and media that matter. Putin's term "managed" or "sovereign" democracy really means a malignant form of Czarism. Despite Russia's demographic implosion, pervasive corruption and widespread lawlessness, a new cold war is being waged. Not only has the country displayed thuggish behavior against Ukraine, Moldova, Estonia, Georgia and the UK in the Litvinenko case, it is supplying arms to rogue states Iran and Syria and their terrorist proxies Hamas and Hezbollah. Anna Politkovskaya's A Russian Diary: A Journalist's Final Account of Life, Corruption, and Death in Putin's Russia exposes the mentality and incompetence of the ruling class.
  
  The geopolitical implications are staggering, as the Putin gang eagerly befriends all enemies of the West. Evidence is accumulating that Russia seeks an alliance with the Islamic world and a partial restoration of the Soviet Empire through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) of which China is a member. The Kremlin ignores the long-term threat from China despite the particularly drastic demographic and infrastructural implosion in Russia's Far East. Whatever other evils follow from Russia's abandonment of Western values, it is sure to become a more barbaric society for its citizens and a considerably more dangerous international player. One may confidently expect it to supply Iran with nuclear weapons technology and to support every loathsome thugocracy that defiles the planet.
  
  Russia is pursuing an energy policy aimed at strangling the liberal democracies by e.g. establishing a gas cartel. An expanded SCO that includes Iran, other Middle Eastern and African states like Libya and Sudan, plus Venezuela is a real possibility. Kagan correctly identifies it as a revived Warsaw Pact. The SCO will lock the Turkic speaking states of Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (plus Persian Tajikistan) firmly in the bear's embrace. The future role of Turkey will be crucial; it remains to be seen how its current pro-religious government will adapt its foreign policy as reaction to the country's certain exclusion from the European inner core. Economic ties to Europe are of course assured but the country might significantly upgrade relations with the Central Asian states and the SCO.
  
  Kagan foresees closer future ties between the USA, India and Japan, rather than a larger role for NATO. Echoing the idea expressed in The UN and Beyond: United Democratic Nations (edited by Anne Bayefsky), Kagan proposes the same type of international organization consisting of democratic states co-coordinating their policies. Perhaps he underestimates the ambition of the Brussels Eurocracy and its resentment of the US. The likelihood of all 27 states uniting is slim, but prospects for closer union of a core group including Germany, France, the Benelux countries, Italy, Spain and a few others are bright. Such a restructuring could be triggered by many factors like the refusal of current member states to relinquish further sovereignty, economic problems or security concerns. While retaining nominal autonomy, the other countries of Europe will undoubtedly accept the Superstate's foreign policy. The loss of the UK will diminish the Anglosphere whilst an alliance with India and Japan might formidably enhance its influence and assure its strategic advantage of continued dominance over three of the world's oceans.
  
  One fact is certain: the USA follows the siren calls of isolationism at its great peril. And the paranoids that tried to demonize the "Hyperpower" will look back on the period of American "hegemony" with affection and nostalgia once the dynamics of the new multipolar world become clear. What distinguishes Kagan's conclusions from the discredited popular notions of the 90s - Fukuyama's fatuous futurology and Huntington's culturally based theory - is that elements of it have already begun to unfold. How comfortable the decade of the Clintons now seems in comparison to contemporary trends. Kagan's book is alarming and unsettling but a much needed tonic for identifying, and preparing for, the coming challenges.
  
  
  
• Yesterday's News, Oversimplified!
  By A22RY8N8CNDF3A on 2008-05-18
  We were all supposed to live happily ever after following the end of the Cold War. However, instead leading powers are once again competing for power, raising the possibility of conflict. In addition, radical Islamists are waging a violent struggle against those believed to have dominated and polluted their world. Kagan believes that the most important question facing liberal democratic countries is to choose whether they want to participate in shaping the future.
  
  Kagan then provides short segments addressing the activities of Russia, China, India, Japan, and the U.S. Clearly Russia is using its oil to rebuild its military (20% growth for each of the last three years), rebuild its citizens standards of living, and rebuild its influence (eg. staging forces near Georgia's border, threatening various former satellites with the cutoff of energy, and railing against efforts to expand NATA into its immediately adjacent lands. China, on the other hand, is committed to raising the standard of living for its people through increased trade in manufactured goods; at the same time it is also building its military (10%/year for the last ten years) and global influence through assistance given to energy-rich nations. Kagan also points out that Taiwan is a particularly intense focus of nationalistic irritation and a potential flash point.
  
  One problem with "The Return of History" is that it is written through a nationalistic U.S. view - downplaying or ignoring our problems with a declining currency, rising debts, and inability to effectively resolve relations with Iran, Pakistan and much of the Islamic world, or even progress in the "War on Terror" (WOT). (Kagan does, however, point out that our alliance with China and Russia in the WOT are largely illusionary as they are focused on different problems than the U.S.)
  
  Any report on the increasing competitiveness between major powers should examine basic questions and likely scenarios. Ever wonder why the U.S. is the primary player in the WOT? Or what would happen within China if the U.S. took a more protectionist trade position, or within the U.S. if China et al stopped buying U.S. government bonds? Or the likelihood of Russia AND China standing behind Iran, in pursuit of its oil and military spending, thus thwarting our aims in Iraq and the M.E.? Or whether more democracy is as good as Kagan believes? (It certainly has led to problems (government paralysis, the excessive role of special interest groups, government by sound-bite, etc. in the U.S., and brought major abuses in Russia pre-Putin as well.) How long can the U.S. support WOT costs at all levels of government, plus our military? What would the imipact be if Venezuela, Iran, Iraq, and Russia refused to sell oil to the U.S.? Kagan doesn't explore such issues, and thus seriously weakens the book.
  
  The best part about "The Return of History" is that it is short and easily read.
  
  
• good crash course
  By A3S6OPYFL6RRWY on 2008-05-17
  Kagan basically gives a quick 100 page overview of the current geopolitical scene. He writes that the idealistic post Cold War period is over and it's belief in a world without geopolitical tension was naive. He states the world is moving more and more into two camps, autocratic states (Russia, China, Iran, Burma, North Korea) vs. liberal states (U.S., E.U., Japan,). This is a very good book for someone who wants to know what is going on around the world without reading some 500 page boring book.
  
  
• Endgame for "war on terror" and now we have to look for the next Kaiser who will challenge the world peace!
  By A2EIEXQVCPXZNG on 2008-06-25
  I found the central argument of this book very convincing. Forget your fears about the terrible Islamic threat to the modern world and start looking to the old 19th century power games that now repeat themselves between great states. Al Qaeda shot its bolt after all and its war is already a thing of the past. Kagan argues that the world is not divided by religion or race as Samuel Huntingdon's "clash of civilizations" theory suggests and the modern trouble with Islam/West seems to vindicate. Rather he argues the real division in modern geopolitics is between democracies and autocracies, with places like the USA, Europe and Japan on one side, and countries like China, Russia and Iran on the other. As he explicitly states in the book, "But in today's world, a nation's form of government, not its `civilization' or its geographic location, maybe the best predictor of its geopolitical alignment". For example, China and Japan may have a shared Asian culture, but one is a democracy and the other is an autocracy, therefore, Japan will have more in common with another democracy, even if it is not culturally similar, that it will with China. He argues that the autocracies are dangerous, not just because of their oppressive internal policies, but because they typically are experiencing rapid economic growth. This allows them to fund a more powerful and threatening military with which to threaten democracies. Kagan acknowledges that one autocracy can have friction with another autocracy: for example, Russia and China may distrust each other over their mutual ambitions in Siberia. Kagan's book supports my view that a great war between major powers is not a too distant possibility and that "Fourth Generation" warfare is as old as man and does not substitute or, even more, erase the old kind of warfare between massive conventional armies. Thus, the USAF leadership may have been right when it planned for new, extremely expensive stealth jets. Although accused for accute "next-waritis" by the current DoD head, may be proved in the future that it was perfectly right in its long view.
  
  
• Good Perspective and Concise Style
  By A2IWBYH2P3EW0F on 2008-06-16
  I found this book quite interesting and easy to read - though I got through and was left wishing for more. The book makes a virtue of being concise and covers quite a lot of ground in a very short space, but I did nevertheless feel that a slightly longer book would have been justified by the material and would have allowed for some greater depth.
  
  Particularly interesting were the points about the evolving political environment and the developing tensions in certain parts of the world and around several key issues. Kagan writes persuasively and has some interesting insights to offer. Worth reading for an interesting take on the world of today.
  
  
• The return of the military-industrial complex
  By A2LSCS5ZUG6VQ on 2008-07-15
  After reading the book/pamphlet, the military industrial complex must be preparing to walk laughing all the way to the back. They could not have written a better book to support their business.
  
  First of all, take Russia. With a rapidly declining population and low life expectations due to perennial alcoholism and rising drug addiction, Russia will never be a serious threat. It is blessed with huge resources including the best agricultural land, but it does not have the population to take advantage of this bonanza.
  As always, Russia will have to rely on foreign technical assistance to stay rich - remember Peter the Great. Russia's tough attitude will go away if America stops being arrogant and shows respect. It certainly does not require a military build-up. And Mr Kagan should know that demographics are a key element in predicting the future.
  
  Second, take China and Asia. To be worried that China could threaten America is to ignore the drastic consequences of CLIMATE CHANGE in this part of the world. China is the most vulnerable to climate change. You can be sure that it will have no time for foreign adventures. China will have to spend all its resources in fighting climate change. India is in the same situation. Any reasonably well informed observer of China knows that China will be deeply impacted by climate change and therefore, it is surprising that Mr Kagan does not consider climate change in his forecast... Even more than Russia, China wants RESPECT, that's all...
  
  So, Mr Kagan's book is quite irrelevant.
  It should concentrate on the real issues. Of course, climate change is the critical issue. And America's refusal to take even minimum steps will turn into a disaster for the world. Mr. Thomas Friedman recommends a gas tax and he is very right, but America says no. The rest of the world wonders why they manage to drive in small cars while Americans cannot...
  
  Another serious issue is the disastrous state of the US economy.When he wrote his book, this was already obvious. In 1945, all the gold of the world was in America. Today, America owes trillions to the Chinese, the Arabs, Russia etc... The real question is how America will reimburse all this debt?
  American rockets and bombs are useless in solving these issues. Only sensible diplomacy and making the effort to be a team player are the true answers. If the world needs America, to-day America needs the world even more.
  
  May be Mr. Kagan's next book...
  
  
  Jean-Paul Delorme
  Châteauneuf, France
  July 16, 2008
  
  
  
• American Power and Purpose
  By ABSXFF8Y2HWN3 on 2008-07-17
  Kagan's Book represents an important addition to the academic literature on American grand strategy and the emerging contest between democracies and authoritarian states. What is most striking is how clearly Kagan illistrates that our present era has many parralells with past world orders. Whilst it may be startling to a generation reared on the end of history thesis, which Kagan plays off, this conflict would be readily apparent to statesman and political leaders in the 19th century. This sobering and at times painful account, painful because it implicitly sets out the missed opportuntites of the 1990s and leaves one wondering how things could have been different (see Donald and Frederick Kagan). What is most striking is that Kagan eloquently illuminates an essential truth, which is increasingly drowned out: Those who espouse an American grand strategy absent moral considerations and without regard to regime type dont seem to understand the country they live in, because America is a country dedicated to certain universal values that empowers and obliges us to intervene and act in regard to our ideology and beliefs since the founding of the Republic.
  
  All in all a great read that eloquently sets out the preeminent challenge of our generation: The marriage of national interest and our deepest beliefs: spreading democracy- because the survival of democracy at home implicitly rests, as Kagan argues on the success of freedom abraod. A must read for those who believe unilateral American disarmament, detente, arms limitation agreements, diplomacy (without regard for cost or morality), and failure in Iraq is without broader and devastating consquences for American diplomacy.
  
  What a strange time to doubt the justice of our regime and cause.
  
  
• Failure of the EU and the end of dreams
  By A3M50P14VHUFN5 on 2008-08-27
  Reading Kagan after Zakaria's The Post-American World is refreshing. It feels as though I'm returning to the real world. This is partly because Kagan is an Historical Realist. It is also because Zakaria is an idealist. He may deny that classification, but he has faith in his statistics, trends and economic forecasts. He looks toward the future confident in what his numbers tell him. He has tasted European idealism and declared it good. The EU followed by a host if idealistic followers has been dreaming. Not only that, they have been operating as though their dreams were a reality. Marx dreamed similar dreams long ago. First he dreamed them and then someone made a reality of them. But things can go wrong when the rest of the world isn't dreaming with you.
  
  Kagan, unlike Zakaria, looks at the present in terms of the past. He sees the return of 19th century power politics - something Fukuyama scoffed at. For Kagan, the EU experiment isn't working very well.
  
  On page 20 Kagan writes, "So what happens when a twenty-first-century entity like the EU faces the challenge of a traditional power like Russia? The answer will play itself out in coming years, but the contours of the conflict are already emerging - in diplomatic standoffs over Kosovo, Ukraine, Georgia, and Estonia; in conflicts over gas and oil pipelines; in nasty diplomatic exchanges between Russian and Great Britain; and in a return of Russian military exercises of a kind not seen since the Cold war.
  
  "Europeans are apprehensive and have reason to be. The nations of the European Union placed a mammoth bet in the 1990s. They bet on the new world order, on the primacy of geo-economics over geopolitics, in which a huge and productive European economy would compete as an equal with the United States and China. . . They cut back on their defense budgets and slowed the modernization of their militaries, calculating that soft power was in and hard power was out. They believed Europe would be a model for the world, and in a world modeled after the European Union, Europe would be strong.
  
  "For a while this seemed a good bet. . . [but] with Russia back on its feet and seeking to restore its great power status, including predominance in its traditional spheres of influence, Europe finds itself in a most unexpected and unwanted position of geopolitical competition. This great twenty-first-century entity has, through enlargement, embroiled itself in a very nineteenth-century confrontation.
  
  "Europe may be ill-equipped to respond to a problem that it never anticipated having to face. . . Many western Europeans already regret having brought the eastern European countries into the Union and are unlikely to seek even more confrontations with Russia by admitting such states as Georgia and Ukraine."
  
  Kagan wrote his book before Russia invaded Georgia, but he saw that coming. He writes on page 24, "What would Europe and the United States do if Russia played hardball in either Ukraine or Georgia? They might well do nothing. Post-modern Europe can scarcely bring itself to contemplate a return of conflict involving a great power and will go to great lengths to avoid it. Nor is the United States eager to take on Russia when it is so absorbed in the Middle East. Nevertheless, a Russian confrontation with Ukraine or Georgia would usher in a brand-new world - or rather a very old world. As one Swedish analyst has noted, `We're in a new era of geopolitics. You can't pretend otherwise.'"
  
  Will Kane threw his badge in the dirt and rode out of town, and the town didn't care. Frank Miller was dead. Who needs Will Kane? But then a few years later Frank Miller, wearing a ski mask, rises from his grave. He isn't dead after all. Quick, send for Will Kane. Does anyone know where Will Kane is?
  
  Lawrence Helm
  www.lawrencehelm.com
  
  
• Clear analysis, optimistic solution
  By A3DNI63EWY4OPF on 2008-05-27
  Clear as a bell, but I don't believe that an association of democracies, such as the author proposed, will be the solution. The nearly unconditional support of Israel by the USA will make this association, with the USA as the most important democracy and the state of Israel as one of the member-democracies, not credible for the states in the Middle East. As long as the situation in this part of the world remains as it is, the proposed association of democracies will be considered as another threatening display of power by the West.
  
  
  
• Modern Geopolitics
  By A3SE3LRPREMZYY on 2008-06-12
  This book is quite short and can be read quickly. One can certainly get a brief look at modern geopolitics by reading The Return of History, End of Dreams. However, because it is so short (about 100 pages), Kagan tends to paint with a broad brush. To me, this was the biggest weakness of the book. For example, he makes broad statements about a given nation's desires and tendencies but offers relatively few specific examples to support his claims. I would have rather the book been closer to 200 pages and contained more information. That being said, I found the book to be very enjoyable and quite informative. Kagan's basic argument is that nationalism and jockeying for geopolitical power did not die with the Cold War. He talks about the various ties (economic and ideological) that have emerged in recent years between the democracies of the world (US, Europe, Japan, India, etc.) and the autocracies of the world (Russia, China, Iran, etc.). Another major point that he tries to make in the book is that the world WILL be shaped by those with the ability and the will to shape it. He ends the book with a short series of suggestions as to how to move forward in today's geopolitical landscape. I would definitely recommend this book.
  
  
• Return of History: Power Politics and Nationalism Here To Stay
  By AK655CMAIGWLF on 2008-08-01
  At barely over a hundred pages this book contains a wonderfully wise and judicious summary of the diplomatic, foreign policy conundrums facing the world today.
  
  On the day I began reading Robert Kagan's Return of History I heard on the news that Russia had begun patrolling the Arctic region with nuclear submarines, something they had not done since the fall of the Soviet empire.
  
  This datum ties in very nicely with Kagan's succinct, well-written book putting current-day foreign policy in its precise qualities: we're certainly not in an era that's "the end of history." Rather, it's a return to power politics and nationalism, when inhabitants of a country feel pride when their country is powerful.
  
  It helps to explain, for example, the rise of Russia, which I hardly hesitate to call fascist, what with the murdering of dissident journalists and former spies, even those residing outside of Russia.
  
  Just before I have written this, I listened to a BBC podcast, NewsPod of 30 July 2008, describing the launching of subs to delve the depths of Lake Baikal, where 20 percent of the world's freshwater is located. The lake I believe is 5,000 feet deep. The Russian sailors chanted "Glory to Russia!" when they emerged from the sub after the dive. Odd-sounding to Westerners, I think.
  
  Kagan, whose previous book Dangerous Nation was very influential for me, changing my ideas of foreign policy--which had been more in line with Pat Buchanan and Ron Paul--is a wonderful, knowledgeable writer who impresses. People are interested in more than being reductionist homo economicus. Reminding me of my college reading of Plato, we possess a soul spiritedness, a thymos, "a spiritedness and ferocity in defense of clan, tribe, city, or state." (page 8) So actors, be they individuals or states, act in ways that may be irrational or counter-productive. That's not always the point.
  
  This spiritedness often manifests itself as simple patriotism, nearly a dirty word to Europeans. Kagan agrees, calling it a "dirty word in the postmodern Enlightenment lexicon, but there is no shame in a government restoring a nation's honor." (30) Indeed. The naiveté of postmoderns will be their undoing.
  
  Russia opposing the United States, even if they may lead to reaction contrary to Russia's immediate interests, is explained very well in The Return of History. Russia is determined to be accepted as a Great Power, even if its economy doesn't warrant it. It's what it once was, and it--led by Vladimir Putin--aims to be thought of once again.
  
  Meanwhile, the European Union (EU) proves feckless and incompetent to contain this traditional ugly behavior (at least from their perspective): "Russia and the EU are neighbors geographically. But geopolitically they live in different centuries. A twenty-first-century EU, with its noble ambition to transcend power politics and lead the world into a new international order based on laws and institutions, now confronts a Russia that is very much a traditional, nineteenth-century power practicing the old power politics." (20) The result is that "Europe may be ill-equipped to respond to a problem that it never anticipated having to face." (22) You think? It's almost humorous watching Germany trying to be passively diplomatic, for example, to Russia's bullying over its natural gas supplies, while it arbitrarily cuts off certain countries like the Ukraine or Belarus.
  
  In regards to China, Kagan asks a good question: "In the long run, rising prosperity may well produce political liberalism, but how long is the long run?" (57) The theory with China is first let it become a thoroughgoing capitalist country, and political liberalizations will follow. We may have to wait a long time on that.
  
  "As China scholar Minxin Pei has pointed out, when Chinese leaders fact the choice between economic efficiency and the preservation of power, they choose power. That is their pragmatism." (61)
  
  NATO is more benign to Russia than a few years earlier, yet is engendering much greater hostility. (61)
  
  "The mistake of the 1990s was the hope that democracy was inevitable." (99)
  
  
• Democracies of the World, Unite
  By A10LWBOIZCF2QT on 2008-08-27
  This short book reads more like a long essay than a book and focuses on the post-Cold War world. Like many recent books, this book is also concerned with the United States' current position in the world given the rise of China, the EU, Russia and Iran. The underlying thesis is that in the years to come states will align themselves not based on region or culture, but rather by form of government and foreign policy. In other words, the world's democracies will strengthen ties amongst themselves by way of economic and political ties while the world's autocracies (namely China, Russia and Iran) will further strengthen its bonds, thereby creating a counterbalance to western democracies. In many respects, such an alignment is already underway and there are no signs of letting up. Kagan suggests that liberal democracy has survived the most deadly century of mankind and it is stronger than it ever has been globally. He doesn't argue that democracy is the superior form of government, but he clearly recognizes that if the world is ever to succeed in its quest for worldwide peace and prosperity, it will be up to the United States and the rest of the world's democracies to get us there. But for the time being, post-Cold War dreams of global unity and cooperation have failed and history as we knew it has returned.
  
  
• Return of Conservatism or Liberalism?
  By A21YEUH7S5G16G on 2008-05-26
  Most of these types of books have long entire chapters full of nonsense you can skip through. This one is so dense there's not one extra word. Basically it goes back to the end of the cold war and carries on from there as if not much has changed.
  
  The only thing I would add is that history didn't just end in terms of the cold war. The whole liberal ideology organized around unions and the like collapsed, and with history returning you should expect that to come roaring back. In other words this book seems to support John McCain but it really supports the old Democrats, which both Obama and Hilary have embraced. It doesn't focus on Wall Street but it undercuts globalism and thus throws into doubt most of what has happened in ecomonics lately.
  
  
• Has History Returned?
  By AG7WXYTHG9CMK on 2008-07-17
  Yes, history has returned according to Kagan. This is an even handed, concise discussion of the geopolitical struggle today between the democratic world (the west etc) and the autocratic world (China, Russia, etc). I am not a fan of Kagan and the neocons, however this is a book that is well worth the read from any political persuasion. Authors would be well advised to indeed give us more of these concise, yet thoughtful books.
  
  
• Concise, highly readable world view update
  By A3UPLGDZFIEUL6 on 2008-06-18
  Not just for students of this genre; High school, college students and book clubs would enjoy and certainly benefit by reading Kagan's updated world view perspective. The world's democracies must comprehend the revival and enrichment of powerful autocracies particularly in Russia and China. Voters and policy makers in the US and the World's democracies would do well to consider his ideas for solution approaches.
  
  
• geopolitics concise and clear
  By A384PVE87PPU3G on 2008-06-16
  A great overview of geopolitics for someone without a great deal of time to devote to the subject. Kagan makes his points clearly and concisely. An excellent little book.
  
  
• Political Realism Via Newspaper Headlines
  By A3LPK5EDQ1ZJCK on 2008-08-29
  'The Return of History' is virtually an afterdinner monologue. 'The Return of History holds that political realism is the order of the day but the book lacks arguements and fails to deliver a broad presentation of facts. The book more or less contains the sort of opinions one might glom onto after reading newspaper headlines.
  
  
• A Quick, Substantive Read Worth Reading
  By A3TY2CROXBSSW9 on 2008-09-04
  In this book, Kagan offers a brief and concise overview of contemporary geopolitics in an increasingly multi-polar world. The hope at the end of the Cold War was that liberal values of democracy and capitalism would spread internationally. The resulting economic interdependence and shared prosperity would result in an end to historic conflicts rooted in differences in ideology, competition for resources or pursuit of power. However, over the course of the past 10-20 years US global hegemonic power has diminished as other powers have arisen whose national characteristics are not shaped chiefly by liberal values. Nations that are happily autocratic instead of democratic wield increasing power and have economic interests that do not always harmonize perfectly with the rest. Geopolitical alliances among many different actors become increasingly complex as support is sought to develop or maintain regional influence, protect ideology, pursue economic interests or maintain sovereignty. These diplomatic relations reflect more the many competing identities present in the geopolitical landscape of the 19th century than a contemporary vision of a world with one shared identity and one common pursuit. Happily, the book is not as moralizing and despairing as the title suggests. However, clearly the new global scenario revealed does present its own challenges that will need to be addressed by present and future leaders. The author does occasionally attribute current developments in the modern geopolitical landscape to his pessimistic fundamental beliefs about human nature, however these remarks are few and far between and the author does not overtly seek to make this the crux of the story. Overall, I found this a quick and useful read to bring one up to speed on current geopolitical happenings and would recommend it.
  
  
  
  
• Thucydidean Return of Man's Permanent Nature in Global Affairs
  By ASQGWYYORNOTT on 2008-12-27
  The Return of History is a concise and clarifying explanation of the state of geopolitics in early 2008 from a very Thucydidean point of view. The author at a point alludes to the ancient Greek concept of thumos, or a spirited connection with kin, not so much as the unifying concept of our time (as Huntington on a larger scale or Ralph Peters on a tribal scale would have it) but as one of the myriad rocks of man's permanent nature on which the ship of pre-ordained international democratic liberalism has foundered since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The main theme of his book is that there is no Marxian march of history towards a single conclusion, no guarantee that liberal democracy as seen in the west in general and as most powerfully crystalized in the US in particular is the ineluctable result of social progression.
  
  The brief illusion that this was the case in the early to mid nineties started to unravel first with the Balkans, then with 9/11, and has, since the publication of this book, come full circle with the Russian invasion of Georgia (not per se predicted by the author who wrote before the event, but was put forward as both highly plausible and consequential) and the liberal democracies' complete inaction beyond empty words in response. Like the shot heard around the world at Concorde the Russian invasion of Georgia bears out the thesis of this book, that liberal democracy is challenged by other legitimating forms of government, namely autocracy born anew in Putin's Russia, and reformed anew in post Tiananmen China. Towards these pole stars of autocracy much of the world aligns, including North Korea, Burma, Iran, Syria, Venezuela (oddly never mentioned in the book) and a growing number of Central Asian and African countries. Radical Islam is also on the rise, a complicating and consequential factor which can wreak much devastation if unchecked, but one which the author believes can never legitimate itself as a viable alternative to liberal democracy and autocracy. But, importantly, one which autocracy does not mind seeing tying down democracy.
  
  The import of the author's thesis is that the liberal democracies must band together and continue to take an active role in the struggle for what form of government people find most desirable and beneficial, and therefore most legitimate to their needs. To believe otherwise he seems to suggest, to believe that liberal democracy is where human nature evolves to, would logically be to bear as a corollary a belief that the democracies need not have fought either world war or cold war of the past century, and to believe that we are free from having to defend and promote liberal democracy today is just as foolish.
  
  A good, quick and easy to read treatise. Recommended.
  
  
• Important Book
  By A286YA9LMKNA72 on 2008-07-29
  An insightful review of where we are in the US today. Should be required reading for all voters.
  
  
• A great study
  By A1FEO5QZ66Z0VI on 2008-08-14
  The author, Robert Kagan, is a brilliant writer, historian and political scientist, much too bright to be a part of the Dick Cheney staff, yet he conceals those prejudices in his writing. He has become one of my favorite authors, and this book is a wonderful study of the history of America's expansionist foreigh policy.
  
  
• The Future Is Now...But Now What?
  By A27IELWEZY98LJ on 2008-09-19
  Kagan has produced a short but very informative summary of the changes in the world's political structures in the past twenty years. Rather than "the end of history" where struggles between countries would melt into a multinational cooperative of combined economies and social structures, the rise of autocracies in China, Russia, and other smaller countries is proving that today is much like yesterday. However, Kagan also provides excellent on the United States' role in such a world. His conclusions are both well-founded and apt, and thus this short but deep read is worth your time as a primer of what may be to come.
  
  
• accurate and up to date
  By AVLGH7OJ2JZL6 on 2008-10-03
  the book gives the reader an easily read up to date review of world politics since the demise of the soviet union as it relates to the course of world togetherness versus nationalism and regional competition among world powers which include the usa,russia,china japan,india and japan. countries which are governed as democracies or autocracies.
  
  

• The Post-American World
• The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order
• Dangerous Nation: America's Place in the World, from its Earliest Days to the Dawn of the 20th Century
• Hot, Flat, and Crowded: Why We Need a Green Revolution--and How It Can Renew America
• God and Gold: Britain, America, and the Making of the Modern World (Vintage)