The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America Reviews

• Read with caution

  
  By A2EADYDGG9UT1I on 2004-12-23
  I have mixed feelings about this book. On the one hand it represents an enormous amount of research. Parts of it are well written and constitute an important resource for anyone who wants to better understand the US-Iran relationship. But the reader should be aware that it's also a flawed book. The author can't seem to make up his mind if he's a progressive or a conservative. He supported the US invasion of Iraq -- and continually attempts to justify that failed policy in this, his latest opus. The reader therefore needs to be alert.
  
  There are numerous problems with the book. Here are some:
  *The author contradicts himself on the second page of his introduction when he arrogantly states "I will say very bluntly that I don't think the US needs Iran..." The author then spends the better part of the next 500 pages presenting powerful evidence that the US in fact does need Iran, very much. For how in heaven's name will we ever succeed in resolving the matter of Iran's nuclear ambitions, what the author refers to as the "problem from hell" without the cooperation -- if not the good will -- of Iran? Answer: we won't.
  
  *The author seriously underestimates the figure of Mossadegh, the vastly popular Prime Minister of Iran overthrown by the US CIA in 1953. Pollack refers to him as reckless and thinks he was an extremist -- not true. The reader would do better to check out Stephen Kinzer's excellent book All the Shah's Men for a clearer look at Mossadegh. In fact he was the Iranian Gandhi, and while he made mistakes he was never the tyrant or dictator described by Pollack. Nor was he inept as a lawyer, which Pollack also implies. Mossadegh was capable enough to plead his case against the Anglo-Persian oil company in the world court -- and to win it in grand fashion. Not bad. Pollack just can't seem to grasp the essential fact that Iran had every right to control its own oil. Mossadegh's biggest mistake was in trusting the treacherous Americans.
  
  *The author continually understates or ignores altogether Israel's role in perpetuating the horrible US-Iran relations. Pollack never mentions the war of words in the Israeli Hebrew press, which started immediately after the 1991 Gulf War (see Israel Shahak, Open Secrets), when Israel began preparing its people for a future war against Iran, the new nemesis, and also began pressing the Americans for regime change. Sharon called for it in the fall of 2002, then Daniel Ayalon the Israeli ambassador to the US repeated the call in April 2003 as the Iraq invasion was winding down. The point is that so far the Israelis have had it their way. They wanted the war against Iraq and now they want a war against Iran. These are facts that Pollack seems never to have heard. His naivete regarding Israel undermines his credibility as a serious scholar.
  
  *The case of the Karine A is another similar example. This was the boat load of Iranian arms headed to Gaza intercepted early in 2002 by Israel. The incident became the smoking gun and supposed proof of Iran's support for terrorism -- and it killed the Iran-US talks that blossomed after 911 and held such promise for improved relations. But Pollack never mentions that at this time the Palestinians were facing a holocaust -- daily bloody incursions by the IDF, targeted assassinations, curfews, checkpoints, Apache rocket attacks, and the destruction of the infrastructure built up during the Oslo peace process. Israel reduced much of the W Bank to smoking rubble during this time, and Pollack completely misses the obvious point: that the Palestinians had every right to arm and defend themselves. The incident should never have been allowed to destroy the US-Iran talks. The case only shows that US talk about freedom is a cruel lie. The truth is that the US does not support the right of the oppressed to fight for their freedom. And in this regard Pollack just doesn't get it.
  
  *The author rambles on about Iran's nuke program, which he correctly identifies as the most serious issue. Yet it never occurs to him that the real solution would require the US to press Israel also to give up its nukes. The only way the US will lead the region is via example, and the matter of Israel -- not just iran -- is the stumbling block. The author also fails to mention one of the principal dangers should the situation go south, for example, if Israel decides to pre empt and surgically hit Iran's nuclear sites. And this vacuole is weird, because Pollack does mention, in his closing remarks, about Iran's great interest in anti-ship missiles. But again, he doesn't get it. If we or Israel hit Iran they will respond by attacking our Navy sitting like ducks in the Gulf. In that case, the entire Gulf will become a killing field, and will run red with the blood of US sailors. This is why we must work for a peaceful resolution!
  
  There are other flaws. But this should be enough to make the reader appropriately chary.
  
  

• A standard for foreign policy books

  
  By A22ZJ9Y723DO3R on 2006-01-05
  Kenneth Pollack worked for 7 years as a Persian Gulf military analyst at the CIA and for 3 years as Director for Gulf affairs at the National Security Council official.
  
  As the reader may know, Pollack's previous work was "The Threatening Storm". In it, he provided a historical perspective to the relations between Iraq and the U.S., and thoroughly analyzed alternatives for engagement based on the information available.
  
  With "The Persian Puzzle", Pollack sets again the standard in foreign policy books. He offers a technical and non-partisan perspective to the history of Iran, its relation with other countries (especially the UK, the USSR/Russia, the US and its Middle Eastern neighbors) and its internal political struggles and infighting. This takes almost 90% of the text. The remaining 10% (around 50 pages) is invested to detailing alternatives for future engagement with Iran. Different than with Iraq, Pollack suggest a combination of approaches might be the the best option to deal with Iran from an American standpoint.
  
  I have found this a truly top-notch work. Here is why:
  - Historical perspective: Pollack provides a historical background to Iran, starting with the Elamites (the first people to civilize what is Iran today, more than 1000 BC), and including the chaos brought by Gengis Khan, the ascendence of Shi'ism, the difficult relation with Russia and Great Britain in the first half of the XX century, Reza Khan and his son the Shah, the involvement of the US (positive and negative) starting mainly from World War II, Khomeini's revolution and the Embassy incident, the Rafsanjani, Khatami administrations and how they interacted with the US (and viceversa).
  - Non-biased, non-partisan view: Pollack acknowledges what now in hindsight were mistakes of US policy regarding Iraq, but does not seem to put the blame on a party, administration or person in particular. He also provides a context and tries to come with a rational explanation for them. In addition, he does not try either to put Iran or its government (or its people) as culprits or bad-intentioned. He goes the extra mile to understand their world view.
  - Structure: this is a well thought book. It was not written in a rush. And the author has a clearly structured mind. The flow is very easy. There is a good sense of purpose for everything. The story is built in such a way that makes sense. The history of Iran comes first, with more intensity and details as the text brings us to the present.
  - Rationality: it does not seem that Pollack wants to "prove us a point" and has written a book to "sell us his plan". He thoroughly analyzes the issue and presents all its details, complexities and paradoxes. Yes, he comes with a proposed solution, but it is not the main point of the book; it just comes as a final chapter and as his personal tack on how to solve a very difficult problem.
  
  Notwithstanding the above, my only concern with this work is the content of Pollack's suggested proposal. Its somehow convoluted and has many "ifs". I realize this is not completely his fault. Actually, it reflects the complexity of the Iranian situation and how difficult it is in this case to find a clear-cut solution. This concern of mine does not, however, affects in any way my conclusion that this book is truly a most for anybody interested in learning more about the true facts of Iran.
  
  In short, if the reader has a strong view about Iran and its relation with the world and wants to find a "confirmation" to his/her opinions, this book probably is not for him/her. However, if the reader is open to learning more about the topic and is willing to see the issue with all of its complexity and gray zones, this book is definitively for him/her.
  
  
  

• Robust analysis

  
  By A27A4YY5DWI3GA on 2005-02-03
  Most of the historical background, except maybe for the Mossadegh period is accurate. Dr. Mossadegh legacy in the modern Iranian politics is enormous. This popular and freely elected leader was overthrown in 1953 with the help of the C.I.A. and was replaced by the late Shah. This event traumatized Iranians for the last 50 years and increased their suspicion on foreign influence in Iranian affairs.
  
  Pollack's analysis of the Iranian psyche is also very accurate. Iranians might have an exaggerated perception of the geopolitical importance of their country, but this is a common character in countries where people have a strong national pride.
  
  Finally, I fully agree with Pollack's multi-facet approach to resolve the current issues. The last thing the region needs is an additional conflict that would further complicate the already entangled situation.
  
  

• Former Marine off Iran in 1980

  
  By A3AR9N2RSUBQBM on 2005-03-03
  I am halfway through this book and find it quite fascinating. The history of how Iran was abused through the ages is unheard of in our hemisphere.
  
  Knowing how England and Russia played games with Iran helps understand the paranoia that Iran had thinking that we were pulling the strings of the Shah: Iranians had a right to be paranoid.
  
  I just wish we were as powerful as they thought, we would have either propped up the Shah or brought down Khomeni.
  
  This book is an easy read, well written, filled with facts and quotes from the time periods mentioned.
  
  It is a scholarly book, not one for a sunny day unless you want to sit down and study it, it is a serious history, not a novel.
  
  http://rescueattempt.tripod.com
  
  

• Great Intro to US-Iran Conflict

  
  By A2UG7HU2RVFMIK on 2007-07-22
  This is an excellent introduction to both the history of US-Iranian relations and the current conflict between the two countries. It is not a history of Iran, or a book about Iran per se. I say that, for while the 428-page text packs loads of information, it is selected to emphasize facts relevant to US-Iranian relations and ignore other issues, so one looking for a history of Iran should look elsewhere.
  
  The book is premised on the belief that Americans know too little about Iran and Iranians know to much about what they think is the truth about America. That is, in a wonderful phrase, Pollack says that Americans are "serial amnesiacs" who are blissfully ignorant of the outside world until a country like Iran does something bad, then we "learn" that a country out there is angry at us, and then we forget again when the crisis passes. Yet while Americans care nothing for Iran, Iranians are obsessed with the U.S. and are constantly replaying for themselves a version of history which is a mix of fact and fiction, and this makes it hard for them to deal with the present.
  
  The book does contain a lot of relevant historical background. In fact, the first 12 chapters trace relations between Iran and first Britain and then the U.S. up through the Bush administration in 2004 (the book was published at the beginning of 2005 and the information cut-off appears to be early 2004). Only the last chapter analyzes the current situation and the options available to the U.S. The value of this book is indeed the background. I take five broad points away from Pollack's analysis.
  
  First, the first five chapters running up through the Islamic revolution in 1979 are invaluable to understanding why Iranians, including many of the majority who do not support the current regime, are distrustful of the U.S. Britain exploited Iran ruthlessly during the colonial period, and the 1953 coup happened mainly because Britain wouldn't accept a 50/50 division of profits on oil royalties. Although the U.S. pressured Britain to compromise, we did engineer the coup of Mossadeq, and this fact gave rise to the myth that the U.S. controlled the Iranian government from then on out. This bred an obsession with foreign influence which is ably exploited by the current regime in Tehran.
  
  Second, the behavior of revolutionary (post-1979) Iran can be modified by deterrence in tactical matters but not strategic ones. Reagan's failure to strike back at Iran for the various hostage takings and killings of Americans during the 1980s emboldened them, while a rout of the Iranian navy and the 1991 defeat of Iraq restored that deterrent posture partially. Iran was also worried in the late 1990s that European public opinion would cause Europe to launch U.S.-style economic sanctions, and combined with the threat of massive retaliation to the Khobar Towers attack (the Saudis wanted the U.S. to bomb Iran back to the Stone Age after that 1996 attack), this caused Iran to moderate its terror sponsorship in terms of murdering dissidents inside Europe and attempts to overthrow the Arab Gulf states. Yet at no time has the Iranian regime halted its support for global terrorism or its nuclear weapons program.
  
  Third, during the 1990s there were two "engagement" policies with Iran, one U.S. and one European, and they both failed. The EU policy was called "critical engagement," and it mean lecturing Iran over human rights and terrorism but never seriously threatening economic sanctions, much less military action. The U.S. approach, begun after the 1997 election of Muhammad Khatami, was to make selected concessions to Iran in hopes of strengthening any attempt by Khatami to change Iranian policy. Yet when the people rose against the regime in 1999, Khatami sided with the regime, and a final attempt at engaging Iran by the Clinton administration was simply laughed at in Tehran. Pollack says that Clinton's engagement policy was worth trying, even though it never really had a chance of success given what happened inside Iran.
  
  Fourth, Iranian conduct toward to West is often driven more by internal Iranian dynamics than anything the West could do or has done. Pollack shows that the 1979 hostage crisis at the U.S. embassy was dragged out by Khomeini as a tool for internal control, and the 1989 fatwa against Salman Rushdie was likewise a Khomeini ploy to strengthen his attempt to freeze Iranian policy in an anti-Western stance after he died.
  
  Fifth, the Iranian regime's bad behavior continued right up to 9/11 and afterward, with that momentous event marking no substantive change vis-à-vis terrorism or nuclear development (they did tone down the rhetoric immediately after the attacks, and work with the U.S. on Afghanistan, but I think this was only because the Shia are a minority in Afghanistan, and they don't want chaos there). Prior to the "Axis of Evil" statement in the 2002 SOTU, Pollack notes events including (1) the Karine A incident (supplying weapons to Palestinian terrorists), (2) safe haven given to al-Qaeda fleeing from Afghanistan and (3) reports of uranium enrichment and nuclear weapons development. This is not to say that it is a good idea for American presidents to call other governments evil, and Pollack certainly does not endorse this approach, but aside from some helpful conduct in Afghanistan, one may reject the notion that the "Axis" statement (or any action by any U.S. president) caused Iran's bad behavior.
  
  Further facts coming to light after this book apparently went to press are worth noting. One, indications came to light that Iran helped the 9/11 hijackers travel from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan so as to make it appear that they went to Lebanon rather than to visit al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. Two, it became clear a couple years ago that Iran was fueling Shia radicalism in Iraq through the militias. I believe this was the case from 2003 as part of a grand strategy to radicalize the Iraqi Shia, but this wasn't clear in 2004.
  
  Overall, I give this book a strong recommend.
  
  
  
• Credible Author???
  By A1C910HQNJ6VNZ on 2004-11-24
  This author's previous book was about the grave threat to the USA by Iraq. This information has been proven wrong, so can we trust him again? This book may be interesting but the author has not had the best rack record with reporting the truth.
  
  
• Vital Reading on Why Ignoring Iran Is a Frightening Mistake
  By A13E0ARAXI6KJW on 2004-11-26
  Twenty-five years after the Iranian hostage crisis, author Kenneth Pollack, a former CIA analyst and National Security Council official, has written a thorough, sometimes frightening, sometimes rose-colored account of the U.S. relationship with Iran. Overshadowed lately by its war-torn neighbor, Iran is a contradictory country that supports terrorism, is building an arsenal of nuclear weapons, and with Saddam Hussein's ouster, evolving into the new key threat in derailing the interminable Middle East peace process. In fact, the author argues that the Bush administration's continued ignorance of Iran's burgeoning prominence will likely result in yet another war based on fictitious weapons of mass destruction. Perhaps still smarting from his previously hawkish stance against Iraq in his last book, "The Threatening Storm", Pollack believes containment should be our new strategy in dealing with Iran. He calls for a flexible approach that would take into account the constant state of flux in Iranian foreign policy, as extremists and pragmatists fight for internal control of the country.
  
  Pollack provides a valuable primer on Iranian history, which is redolent of the suffocating xenophobia of Iranian leaders like Mohammed Mossadegh and the Ayatollah Khomeini. Nineteenth century European imperialism shaped a lot of the current Iranian suspicion of foreign interference in their affairs. The author also discusses the Iranian tendency to resent and resist their rulers, obviously peaking with the Shah's 25-year regime until his overthrow in 1979. And most pertinent, Pollack reviews the many traumatic encounters between the United States and Iran over the last fifty years, which of course, culminated with the fourteen-month long ordeal in the taking of the U.S. hostages. This was a defining moment in our own history, scarring the American psyche and making the U.S. look weak in the eyes of the world. Jimmy Carter's presidential legacy took a tumble as a result (the hostages were released just hours after Reagan's inauguration), and the perceived weakness invited challenges that persist today. When one sees the beheadings of Westerners like Daniel Pearl by terrorists, one cannot help speculate that the hostage crisis was the spark that led to such atrocious activity. Ironically, the author seems less thorough when it comes to looking at Iran within the context of the ongoing Iraqi conflict. One can deduce that Pollack's aversion to war has something to do with leaving a power vacuum in the region that would make it particularly ripe for a greater flourishing of the al-Qaeda network. What he does far more effectively is put America's relationship with Iran into historical perspective. This level of understanding is critical in any negotiations with the Iranians. For instance, many are still furious at the Shah twenty-five years later for a multitude of sins, from his creation of a repressive police state to his squandering of money on military equipment. Unfairly or not, they continue to blame the U.S. for being colonial allies to his master plan. Pollack is actually generous in pinning the blame entirely on the Shah, and he even forgives U.S. policymakers in the 1970's for their failure to anticipate Ayatollah Khomeini's ascendancy.
  
  According to Pollack, Iran is at a pivotal cusp in history at this very moment. Depending on how well Iraq fares as a democracy, Iran could follow suit or continue on its path toward a complete Islamic autocracy. Just how the Bush administration deals with Iran for the next four years will be a real test of the global leadership to which the U.S. aspires and needs to define if there is going to be any inroads in thwarting the ongoing terrorist threat. Pollack provides valuable reading, critical for anyone who wants to understand the broader Middle East political situation.
  
  
• A New Analysis to Understand U.S.-Iran Tensions
  By A3U60UNC9U8TYM on 2005-06-18
  The Persian Puzzle : The Conflict Between Iran and America by Kenneth Pollack is an unusual book in a sense that it addresses the questions of perceptions that exists between the administrations of the two countries. The author points to the variety of misperceptions that govern the policies of the United States towards that important nation of the Gulf. There is no denial in the fact that the Iranians are sophisticated in their approach and have in the past, very cleverly averted the effects of the American sanctions.
  
  The formula for better relations between the United States and Iran is that the sovereignty of Iran must be respected and any future plans of brinkmanship must not form a foreign policy option. It cannot be conceived, as Pollack rightly say to occupy Iran as it was done in the case of Iraq. Any preemptive strike against Iran would have adverse effects for the United States. A logical approach would be to negotiate with the Iranians, directly or through the Europeans and to start a meaningful dialogue. Enough lessons are already learnt from Afghanistan and Iraq.
  
  It's a good reader as the author presents a new approach towards Iran with an objective analysis of the history of relations between the two countries. The highlight of the book is the set of various options that Kenneth Pollack presents for the diffusion of the continuous tensions between the two countries.
  
  Prof. Dr. S. Farooq Hasnat
  Former Chairman,
  Department of Political Science
  University of the Punjab
  Lahore, Pakistan
  
  
  
• informative and easy to read
  By A2SMLMZWMPNPKK on 2005-10-19
  I don't agree with everything Pollack puts forward in this book. However, I think he has the experience that warrants people giving him a fair shot. I consider myself a moderate and that's how Pollack comes across in this book. I also think that just because he was wrong about one thing (and his company in this group is quite vast), doesn't mean this book is not helpful.
  
  I should say first that if you're expecting an Iranian history book, you should probably look elsewhere. There is a fair amount of history here, but the book's primary focus is documenting Iran's relationship with the U.S. Some reviewers below claim that Pollack's history is kind of murky. I haven't read enough about Iran to judge those statements, but Pollack has quite a long track record of dealing with Iran from inside the U.S. government, and as such his description and explanation of events goes a long way if you're tyring to understand Washington's policy towards Iraq.
  
  One area where Pollack can be faulted I think is when he goes off on side talks about Iraq and how the U.S. was handling that country during the 90's. Now to be sure, Pollack is not the only author I've read that has done this, but that's no excuse, and also as someone working in the government he knows darn well that the U.S. was violating the spirit of the same UN resolutions at the same time Iraq was. The question this raises for me is "if he's not being fully honest about this, how reliable is he about Iran?" Well, the unfortunate answer is that we don't know how accurate all the information is that we get in books like this. It is our responsibility to read as much as possible and then try to determine the truth. Again, it's sad but true so get over it and read a few books. You'll be better off for it anyway.
  
  Overall, I think Pollack has produced a good book. His recommendations for Iran are helpful and I really think he puts all the available options on the table and argues convincingly for what he thinks is best. Should you read other books about Iran? Yes. Is this one a bad place to start? No.
  
  
• More History the Perscription
  By A3JU54SZJH9K1P on 2005-01-02
  Mr. Pollack's latest work is an impressive critique of past U.S. engagement with Iran. Coming a mere two years after an arguably mistaken advocacy for the Iraq invasion, his redemptive efforts are obvious: the overwhelming thrust of the work is retrospective, not prospective, in nature.
  
  That being said, Mr. Pollack has written an extremely cogent and complete narrative of U.S.-Iranian relations. Topics are covered in an orderly fashion that blends together seemingly isolated events, showing how they all combine to create Iran's stormy past and our turbulent bi-lateral relationship. If it is perspective you seek, then "Persian Puzzle" is the order of the day; however, if the reader desires a more prospective debate, Mr. Pollack's work is lacking--only a single, albeit long, chapter is devoted to proffering solutions for the "future". As an introductory tome, Mr. Pollack has succeeded, but it is doubtful that this book will move the debate over how to engage Iran in any meaningful way.
  
  
• The options for American policy vis- a-vis Iran
  By AHD101501WCN1 on 2005-01-25
  This work is first of all an illuminating survey of Iranian political history. It begins with the first movement of Indo- European peoples into Iran and traces the story to today's regime of the Mullahs. It in tracing this history which is largely the history of a vast empires it reveals a great deal about Iranian national character. According to Pollack the Iranians have the arrogance of those who have been a great imperial power. They too as a power which has been conquered more than once have a real suspiciousness toward the world outside. This extends also to their Sunni Muslim brothers as Iran is at present the only Shiite regime in the world. Pollack is an especially good narrator of Iran's historical development. But his real focus and aim is to provide the reader with the background to the present American - Iranian relationship. In this regard he focuses in later chapters on the overthrow of the Mossedaqh regime in 1953 and the American embassy takeover in Tehran which helped cause the downfall of the Carter Administration. Pollack in his last chapter tries to outline the options for United States action towards Iran. And the Persian puzzle of the title is the puzzle of how to work out properly these relations. The United States and Iran are totally estranged from each other. Iran is according to the US State Department the largest state- supporter of terror in the world. Iran is according to many observers a supporter of anti- American action in Iraq. And Iran has been working for years clandestinely to develop its own nuclear option. Here one should understand what the Israeli scholar Ephraim Kam has pointed out in his study of Iranian military development in the past thirty years. The tremendous trauma of the Iraq war in which Iranians were subject to non- conventional gas warfare by the Iraqis is one of the major elements impelling them to the nuclear option. But the Iranians also wish to balance and counter US power. The Iranians conceive of the nuclear option as a means of driving the US from the region , and Israel out of the world entirely. The Iranians are steadily working to increase the range of their missiles and parts of Europe may already be in their reach. Their long- range goal is to be able to reach not only US troops in the Mideast but heartland America. One of Pollack's central points is the tremendous importance of containing Iran. He is not however certain that this can be done now. He believes that the Iranians have so scattered and placed underground their nuclear facilities that the US may simply not have a viable option of preemption. He is even more emphatically against the possibility of a US land- invasion of Iran which he believes would be a great mistake. Iran is four- times the size of Iraq and is a much more formidable force to contend with in every way. The US is as it is now over- extended, and so Pollack does not believe the military invasion option is a real one. Pollack argues for the US making a combined effort with European allies, and others offering Iran incentives , economic and otherwise in order to forestall or at least contain a nuclear Iran. This method of dialogue is the approach of the Germany France Great Britain and thIAEA now, and there is no sign that it is working. Iran has a strong Russian connection( The Russians are building their nuclear facility at Bushehr) and more especially an increasingly closer relationship with China.China has already indicated it would veto any sanction effort against Iran in the U.N. US sanctions have been in place against Iran for some time now and have only worked to encourage Iran to deepen its Russian and Chinese connections. Thus the path of dialogue despite its being urged by many US foreign policy experts does not seem likely to stop Iran . Pollack indicates that there is strong opposition to the Iranian regime from the people .And that over a long - period it is possible to hope that the regime may be overturned. But the nuclear clock is ticking faster than that. And the nuclear issue is the one issue on which the regime has the total backing of its citizens. This may not only because they feel threatened by having the US nearby but even more importantly, psychologically, because they feel as a great empire nuclear weapons are their right. In any case Pollack is honest and realistic in assessing the difficult situation the US finds itself in - in trying to understand how to relate properly to Iran. However his suggestion that the US might be wise to rely on deterrence, and accept the coming into being of a nuclear Iran seems a particularly unwise one. There is a general consensus of non- proliferation experts that a nuclear Iran will lead to a nuclear Saudi Arabia and a nuclear Egypt, and a world far more dangerous. There is even the suggestion that it will break down completely all non-proliferation agreements, and trigger a world- wide nuclear arms race. A nuclear Iran would have greater power over its Gulf neighbors who already are threatened by it. Therefore it would seem that Pollack is right in not completely foreclosing a preemptive action( not to take over the territory of Iran) but to stop it or delay it for years from becoming nuclear. The exercise of such an option might too be incentive for regime change in Tehran though such an outcome is by no means guaranteed.
  Another dimension of the Iranian- US relation is of course in the context of the US struggle against Terror worldwide.Iran is an ideologically driven state whose declared aim is the export of the Islamic revolution throughout the world.
  Pollack's book is an outstanding guide to the overall history and development of Iran. It provides some of the options for possible US action vis- a- vis Iran in the future. But here it is by no means comprehensive or definitive. And it is to be hoped that the Intelligence Services of the United States ( and perhaps too Israel) have a good enough picture of what is happening in Iran to ensure that a nuclear Iran does not come into being which will threaten the world as a whole. Iran at present is driven both by memories of its own past historical grandeur and by fundamentalist religous callings. Its hostility as Bernard Lewis has pointed out in other contexts to the US is not simply military and religious but cultural and moral. It does not seem then that the word ' compromise'is most suited for dealing with the Iranian Revolutionary Islamic Regime now. What does seem more hopeful is the idea that Iran has many strands in its rich past. And that at some point these strands will once again come to the fore .
  
  
• Simply Excellent
  By A2ENIQZX6VJYUM on 2005-11-29
  I approached this book not knowing really what to expect, i.e.: does the book try to justify past US policies or is it a rational discussion. It is the latter. The author tries to clear the political air in the introduction and set the record straight on why we have problems with Iran. He uses a direct quote from the Iranians regarding a speech from Secretary Albright who acknowledges the over 25 years of US interference in the politics and leadership of Iran starting with the shah in 1953 and ending with the aid to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq conflict in the 1980's. This of course is contrary to public posture at home that our actions are about promoting democracy abroad. It is clear that past actions against Iran were to promote US commercial, trade, and strategic defense interests at the expense of the Iranians. So that admission up front is refreshing. Many Iranians had expected help from the US, not a new imperial power to replace Britain and Russia that had dominated Iran for most of the 19th century and half of the 20th century. So the question now is simply this: can we build a new relationship, especially with that 200 history of mistrust with Russia, Britain, and America?
  
  The book is somewhat long and can be described as comprehensive; it is well written suitable for the average reader and it is a fairly quick and light read. The pages seem to whiz by like a Jack London novel. It has about 428 pages of main text with five maps, and is followed by 60 pages of notes and a bibliography approximately 25 pages in length. It covers 13 subjects including a history of Iran, the shah, the rise of US influence in Iran, the hostage crisis, the Iran-Iraq war, and the post 1980 political developments in Iran.
  
  The first chapter - about 30 pages long - presents a short history of Iran including the dealings between Iran and Britain and Russia. That takes the reader to approximately the year 1900 - 1914. After that there are two chapters that lead us through the events surrounding the ousting of the Iranian leader Mosaddeq by royalist troops in 1953. The author thinks that a certain myth has developed about the coup that overstate the American-British role and, in Iranian mind's at least, to exaggerate the role of the CIA. In the next 70 to 80 pages the author takes us through the 25 year reign of the shah, his spending, his use of terror, and the inequities in Iranian society which finally trigger the fall of the shah. The Iranians tend to equate America with the reign of the shah, and the failure of the US to apply human rights standards to that country while espousing them at home, especially by Carter.
  
  The next 200 pages describe the developments related to Iran from 1980 going forward including many details on the primary Iranian political figures, the long and exhausting war with Iraq, the current and past Iranian views of the US in the 1990's, Islamic fundamentalism, supporting terrorism against mainly Israel, Iranian designs on controlling the Gulf region, suport of some Al Qaeda members by Iran, the Karine A incident, Hamas, the Geneva working group on Afghanistan, the Axis of Evil speech, Iranian nuclear weapons, etc.
  
  Finally we have perhaps the most interesting chapter, a chapter on developing future US strategies. That is in fact the reason for the title of the book, The Persian Puzzle. Can we do anything to solve the problems short of a war? It is a puzzle that can be solved by either attacking Iran or more rationally attempting to develop a long term relationship with Iran, possibly following many paths in parallel. In the final analysis short of war it will be a decision to be made by Iran.
  
  Whether you agree with everything the author presents in the book, or do not, one will find the book to be informative and stimulating. Easily 5 stars.
  
  
• Devotes little attention to helping democratic tendencies inside Iran...
  By AV1ITXWQ13PN6 on 2006-01-17
  As Patrick Clawson said: The standoff with the Islamic Republic of Iran has frustrated each of the last five U.S. presidents, going back to Jimmy Carter, as one U.S. initiative after another has failed. One recurring problem has been that Washington's reaching out to Iranian figures thought of as moderates or pragmatists then boomerangs. This pattern surfaced when national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski met in November 1980 with Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan, which days later led to the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran; the Iran-contra affair offers another example.
  
  Pollack presents a fascinating 130-page account of this same U.S. effort to reach out to reputed Iranian moderates, but during the Clinton administration, when he worked on Iran at the National Security Council. After a detailed description of these efforts, he concludes, "I was wrong in [the] assessment ... that we had come very close to making a major breakthrough ... [E]verything that truly mattered was in the hand of people who were not ready or interested in improving ties with the United States."
  
  Unfortunately, Pollack buries his interesting material about Clinton's Iran policy at the end of 245 forgettable pages on Iranian history drawn almost entirely from U.S. sources, ignoring excellent materials available from other Western scholars (including some in English) as well as a rich historiography in Persian. His account, therefore, reflects the strengths and weaknesses of American scholarship on Iranian history-exaggerating the sins of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, for instance, while overlooking his accomplishments. Thus does Pollack write at length about the failures of the Iranian economy under the shah when in fact Iran's economic growth in 1953-78 was the fastest in the world.
  
  In his final fifty pages, Pollack makes recommendations for future U.S policy toward Iran, most of which can be described as the triumph of hope over experience: once again, he says, Washington should reach out to Iranian pragmatists and try to arrive at a bargain. If Tehran continues with its nuclear program, he does propose to prepare to take firmer action against Iran, including, in the extreme, taking a "hard look" at military action. Unfortunately, he devotes little attention to helping democratic tendencies inside Iran although the country's transformation away from an Islamic dictatorship offers the only means to ensure good and lasting U.S.-Iran relations.
  
  
  
• Great book!
  By A3ML5ARTHND34L on 2006-03-06
  This is a great book. Overall, this book is excellent, informative, educational and certainly worthwhile to read.
  
  THE PERSIAN PUZZLE provides a clear and balanced overview and description of the historical and evolving relationship between the U.S. and Iran (this is not a book about the history of Iran, but instead its relationship with America), as well as each side's perception of the other and related world events.
  
  Took off one star in the rating for two reasons:
  
  (1). though the author does an excellent job in giving the reader an understanding of the historical U.S.-Iran relationship, he does not necessarily tell this story in the broader context of other world events, e.g., the Cold War, to name just one, and the interplay between these other events/actors and the U.S.-Iran relationship [the U.S.'s relationship with Iran is just one of many, but the reader is given a somewhat narrow lense to interpret events described in the book]; for a book that's 425 pages, too much of it "leads the reader to believe" that this bilateral relationship occurred in a vacuum -- external factors aren't brought in to the equation (at least not in-depth) to possibly give perspective to decisions or actions.
  
  (2). the book concludes (50 pages) with the author's strategy for U.S. policy towards Iran. This isn't so much a criticism of the author's conclusions or suggestions -- it's more that his recommendations aren't very bold or enlightening. He recommends a 3-track approach, with each track nothing more than a small/large increase of the preceding track (almost "just more of the same"). At a minimum, not sure why this last chapter took up 50 pages when most of its conclusions and recommendations were gradually outlined in prior chapters.
  
  This is a book that everyone should read. As the author himself notes in the book, Americans just don't know much, if anything at all, of the historical relationship between these two nations over the last 50+ years.
  
  
• Now what?
  By A16CB9KZ8OER76 on 2005-01-10
  This is a very interesting and timely book. Ken Pollack is a former US government expert on Iran and Iraq. Two years ago, just prior to the invasion of Iraq, I read Ken Pollack's earlier book The Threatening Storm where he argued forcefully in favor of a military invasion to remove Saddam Hussein and his odious regime from power. Of course, since then we have run into many difficulties and Mr. Pollack has been distancing himself from it all, saying things like, "Oh yes, I favored AN invasion, but they did it all wrong, Blah, Blah, Blah." As if such a problem could ever be solved painlessly or without a big mess to clean up. Who is kidding who? In this book he recounts the history of Iran, another big headache. Why do they hate us so much? Why do they oppose the Middle East peace process? Why is Iran now arguably the world's worst state sponsor of terrorist groups? Where do they figure into the problem of nuclear proliferation? These are the type of questions that Mr. Pollack attempts to address in this book starting about 100 years ago when Iran figured in the Great Game between the British and Russian empires. Then the British decided to switch their navy from coal to oil and depended upon Iran as their gas station. Iran was then occupied by Allied forces during WW2 because of its oil and strategic location. After the war the US helped place the Shah of Iran back upon his father's throne so that he could guarantee relative stability and pro-Western policies during the Cold War. Of course, the Shah was toppled by the popular revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeni in 1979 and has been more or less an Islamic Republic ruled largely by the mullahs ever since. However, the forces of moderation and pro-Western liberalism have never been entirely eliminated and have shown themselves recently to have great popular support. The way Mr. Pollack tells it, the Iranians feel that they have been used as a pawn by the major powers for a long time and resent it. They aspire to be a major player themselves, especially in that region. They view Israel as a modern day Crusader state, an outpost of Western influence in the Islamic world, and are determined to drive both Israel and its patron the US out of the region. As if that isn't enough, they are VERY close to getting the BOMB. As usual the Europeans talk up a smoke screen while they conduct business as usual figuring that its the US problem to protect them when things go bust. What a nightmare! Mr. Pollack caused me to raise my eyebrows when he presented a rationalized defense of Jimmy Carter's handling of the 444 day hostage crisis. This was one of the most disgraceful episodes of US history that I can recall. In my view, many of the subsequent actions by people like Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden were prompted by the perception of America as a cowardly giant that resulted directly from the Iran hostage crisis. Of course, Reagan didn't do much better. He got involved in the Beirut quagmire and then cut and ran after 241 Marines were killed by a truck bomb. He tilted to Saddam Hussein during the Iran/Iraq war. Bush, the father, did better when he led the coalition that evicted Saddam Hussein from Kuwait in the first Gulf War. The book gets most interesting when it gets to the Clinton years, presumably because this is where the author was most personally involved in the policy making. Of course, the centerpiece of Clinton's foreign policy was the Middle East peace process. He quickly discovered that Iran was ready, willing, and able to wreck it all for him. To hear Mr. Pollack tell it, the Clinton Administration engaged in heroic efforts, including at least 10 or 12 overtures and gestures, to try to get better relations with Iran, only to eventually fail. For me, its hard to escape the conclusion that the Iranians simply strung Clinton along for eight years before finally rebuffing him, just like Yassir Arafat did with the peace process itself. Along comes 9/11 and George W. Bush declares war against all terrorists and their state sponsors. Mr. Pollack expresses almost amazement that the Iranians have been very cooperative, even helpful during the US led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. And this is largely true even after Bush included Iran in his Axis of Evil speech. My take on this is that while the Iranians were quite confidant that Clinton would never go after them they were worried that Bush might do just that and so they decided to play along for time while they are working night and day to get a usable nuclear bomb. Then they'll be sitting pretty. They obviously figure, correctly in my view, that no US president, not even George W. Bush, will go after a country which possesses nuclear weapons. Iran can then go back to sponsoring suicide bombers, etc, confidant that US policy will then be limited to containment and sanctions, etc, with the military options completely off the table. At the same time, the Bush Administration realizes that Iran can cause major problems for us in Iraq and even in Afghanistan and so is studiously attempting to avoid any clash with Iran for the time being. This current state of affairs boils down to a horserace with Bush & company betting that they can get a handle on the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan in time to deal with the Iranian nuclear threat, while the Iranian government is betting that they can get the BOMB before Bush can extricate himself from Iraq and Afghanistan and then do anything to stop them. Of course, sad to say, anything initiated by the Europeans through the IAEA or anything else should be regarded as a smokescreen intended to permit them to conduct business as usual. The game is afoot!
  
  
• Excellent book concerning history far too many Americans know nothing about
  By A2PSMJZW2AZJO on 2005-11-11
  The Persian Puzzle is a very good history of the relationship between the United States and Iran -- a relationship, in both its positives and negatives, that most Americans are ignorant of in all but the broadest and most general senses. Given the centrality of the Middle East to the world economy, and the prominence of the nation of Iran (under whatever current, historical, or hypothetical government) in the region the one sure thing is that the dynamic between the United States and Iran will continue to be an issue of great significance.
  
  Pollack, whose credentials concerning the region are quite solid, provides an excellent starting point for those interested in understanding how the US-Iranian relationship has evolved through time. He does so in a manner that does not shy away from recognizing the cultural quirks in both nations (i.e. Iranian pride and nationalism, the deficit in long-term planning and attention span in the US, among other things on both sides) have left their mark on the relationship. To acknowledge that people are not generically people, but possessed of differing values, ideals, etc., by dint of cultural variation may be problematic to some, but it is, at the end of the day, also entirely realistic and any analysis that glosses over such differences of world view between Iranians and Americans is bound to fail.
  
  The first portion of the book provides a relatively brief overview of Iranian history as a means of setting the scene for the last 60 years, which makes up the bulk of the book which covers up into the George W Bush presidency and the war in Iraq and Afghanistan (details of which, pertaining to Iran, may very well surprise the average reader). Some other reviewers of this book, whom I suspect have not read the work at all, have been critical of Pollack because he was an advocate of military intervention in Iraq -- as a caveat to that, I would note that, first of all, he has apparently revised his assessment now that the incredibly poor quality of pre-war intelligence has been revealed, and also would note that he is not in any way, shape, or form a unwavering cheerleader for the Bush administration. He certainly gives the Bush administration credit where credit is due, but he, likewise, finds fault with the administration as well -- only Jimmy Carter's inept handling of the Iranian revolution seems to generate more criticism from Pollack (who was most intimately involved in Middle East policy during the Clinton administration) than the Bush administrations inability to formulate a coherent response to Iran.
  
  As is customary in these sorts of works, the final portion of the book is dedicated to analysis and policy suggestions for the future of US-Iranian relations, which Pollack suggested (correctly, as subsequent events have borne out) that the issue of Iranian nuclear weapons development will be the central concern driving US policy. The reader, depending on their politics, may find themselves in agreement or disagreement with the author on these policy suggestions but, like them or hate them, they are seperable from an excellent historical narrative that focuses on an issue that more Americans really should understand thoroughly.
  
  I highly recommend this book and would urge any potential reader to look beyond the various uninformed reviewers who are projecting their anti-Iraq War politics or other political agendas onto this book. As I said previously -- agree or disagree with his conclusions as you will, but the history presented is an invaluable education for Americans who wish to understand our nation's present and future actions in the Middle East.
  
  
• The Most Comprehensive Mainstream Analysis of Iran ...
  By A3IYSXWUHI6P23 on 2006-10-27
  Kenneth Pollack's "The Persian Puzzle" is probably the best and most comprehensive analysis of the Iran that has received mainstream and widespread acclaim.
  
  Pollock, known for his prior unabashed support of an Iraqi invasion ("The threatening Storm"), has followed up that work with his most recent book. At the outset, in outlining a strategy for dealing with Iran, it is important to note that the author has shied away from his previously hawkish outlook with regard to Iraq. Whether he is gunshy (literally) because of positions he previously advocated or whether he truly believes that the decision to use force against Iran deserves considerably more caution is not quite clear. Nevertheless, I completely enjoyed his book and appreciated his research.
  
  In my opinion, Pollock is undoubtedly one of the seminal writers and policy-wonks with regard to the Middle East. His analysis of Iran, especially its history, and his compact description of how the United States found itself where it stands today is incredibly focused and prescient.
  
  Particularly, Pollock masterfully outlines both the overthrow of the Shah, Mohammed Mossadegh, in 1953 and more particularly the subsequent Iranian Revolution initiated in 1978. In describing these events, the author focuses specifically on America's involvment in each episode and more importantly the Iranian's contempt for America with regard to each incident. From an Iranian perspective, these two events seem contradictory. In 1953, the United States along with Britain ousted someone who was perceived as a dictatorial leader un-receptive to classical liberal ideals ostensibly sweeping the globe (Huntington's "Second Wave"). Then, in somewhat contradictory fashion, in the late-1970's, Iranian elites cracked down on liberalization thus allowing Ayatollah Khomeini to assume the position of Supreme Leader and impose revolutionary Islamic rule. Though these incidents seem at odds from an Iranian perspective, Pollock ellucidates one constant that exposes itself throughout recent Iranian history: Contempt for the United States brought on by the Iranian perception that America has unnecessarily and repeatedly injected itself into Iranian internal affairs.
  
  Pollock predictably points out (though somewhat more intelligently) that recent Iranian history is filled with examples of the Iranian government and thus society rapidly regressing while attempting to beat back the United States. With this framework in mind, Pollock outlines a number of policy options ("Tracks") with which the United States is currently faced: (1) hold open the prospect of the 'grand bargain' (Iran abandoning its support for terrorism and nuclear weapons in exchange for the U.S. lifting unilateral sanctions and normalizing relations with Tehran); (2) a true carrot-and-stick approach; and/or (3) preparing for a new containment regime.
  
  In outlining the potential strategies for delaing with Iran, Pollock seemingly concludes that any policy, in and of itself, is a Catch-22. Though trite-sounding, the ball has been in the Iranian court for decades, yet they have refused to return service as a result of their helter-skelter recent history. The problem with any Washington policy implemented with regard to Iran is not the details of the policy itself, but the problem is seemingly the actual presence of any policy in and of itself.
  
  
• Iran from the US Government's Perspective
  By A2ZJA5DJC0QNXJ on 2007-01-13
  Just because Kenneth Pollack has never been to Iran and doesn't speak Farsi, doesn't mean that he is not knowledgeable on the topic of Iran. On the contrary, his book is well worth reading. However, since his knowledge of Iran comes from positions he has held in government, including positions at the CIA and in the White House, his view is inevitably one that sees things from a US foreign policy perspective.
  
  First of all, he seems to be a one man cheerleading team for Israel. He describes how "Jerusalem embarked on the risky process of peacemaking..." (p. 263), with no mention of how much more risky peacemaking is when you're on the vanquished side of the conflict. He explains how Rabin was "plodding along the difficult road to peace" (p. 273), how he "had been so universally respected for his courage in trying to make peace" (p. 277), and how "Peres was more devoted to the cause of peace than Rabin had been" (p. 278). Moreover, Pollack considers the massacre by the Israeli army of more than 80 innocent civilians at Qana, Lebanon as a simple "shelling incident" (p. 280). To his credit, he does mention the Sabra and Shatila massacres in Beirut that were perpetrated by Maronite Christians (pp. 201-02), however he conveniently left out the part about Israel being cooperative and complicit in the whole affair and how this responsibility was confirmed by the investigation conducted in Israel by the Kahan Commission.
  
  Another theme in Pollack's writing about Iran is a general contempt for the Iranian people. He says in one sweeping statement, for example, that "Iranian society has a powerful tendency toward anarchy" (p. 142). Pollack suggests that maybe this could be because their country is carved up into isolated communities by the mountains, although he doesn't explain why the Swiss don't tend toward anarchy as well. He also offers the argument that the Iranian people have "resented and resisted every government they have had over the last two millennia" (p. 142). This is another rather sweeping statement that would require much evidence to substantiate. The only evidence that he bothers to marshal for this assertion is his own paltry 26-page coverage of the first 1900 of that 2000 years.
  
  And in a final expression of arrogance (a quality not unheard of in US foreign policy making), Pollack explains how impracticable an invasion of Iran would be. He expounds on all the obvious obstacles (Iran's geographical size, its population size, its ranges of rugged mountains) and then concludes that "as American units passed through the mountains en route to Tehran and other major cities in the interior, they would be hit constantly by Iranian insurgents" (p. 382). So, imagine this for a moment. You, your family, and your ancestors share the common heritage of a civilization that stretches back several thousand years. A foreign country invades your soil and when you resist they call you the insurgent. The American Heritage Dictionary defines an insurgent as one who rises in revolt against established authority. So Pollack would evidently consider the American army to be the "established authority" immediately upon invading Iran, and by implication that resistance against this authority would be illegitimate.
  
  At bottom, Pollack's book is written from a typical US government perspective--and it is informative in that regard. However, if you are looking for objectivity or alternative views, I'm afraid you'll have to look elsewhere.
  
  
• No Title
  By A1UT6U9DR2XI9B on 2006-02-20
  Reading Pollack's book there are some conclusions that I came to.He makes a good case arguing why it would be dangerous for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons.Not only have they been supporters of terrorism,they have also been directly involved in committing terroristic acts against Western countries,including the United States.Considering the track record of the regime in Tehran there is no way that they should be allowed to get their hands on an atomic bomb.
  BUT!From my reading of Pollacks' book,the only way that you could guarantee that Iran would not develop nuclear weapons would be to remove the present government.That means either orchestrating a coup (which Pollack explains is unlikely to happen),or invading Iran and deposing the government by force.Given what happened to the U.S. in Iraq,invading Iran is not a likely option.The problem isn't that the US military wouldn't be able to defeat Iran's armed forces,the problem is that they'd have to occupy the country afterward.Iran is 4 times the size of Iraq with 3 times the population.Given that in the estimate of General Eric Shinseki you needed several hundred thousand troops to occupy Iraq (between 300 and 400 thousand troops)* you would need at least the same number to occupy Iran and probably even more.So we're talking about a force of several hundred thousand troops possibly even up to a million.How long could the United States keep a force that size in Iran?
  Nor does bombing Iran seem to be the answer.Iran has over 2 dozen nuclear facilities (that we know about) scattered throughout the country.Pollack argues that you wouldn't be able to destroy them all in a sneak attack.Instead,any air attack would have to be sustained and conducted over several weeks-perhaps even longer.Of course the Iranians have their own air-defense system which, unlike the Iraqi one,is not in a state of disrepair.So if you were planning a bombing campaign,you'd have to take out Iran's air defenses first.This raises the possibility that while the United States attacked Iran's defenses,the Iranians might dismantle some of their equipment and move it to secret locations.As Pollack points out,in the end,even after you'd destroyed all of Iran's nuclear facilities you couldn't be guaranteed that you'd destroyed all of their equipment.
  The bottom line is that there are no good solutions for dealing with the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran.Any military option you consider is likely to create as many problems as it solves.Pollack's aim I think,in writing this book is to be upfront with the American public and warn them that there is no quick and easy answer.
  
  * PBS Frontline.James Fallows quoted in "The Invasion of Iraq".Interview conducted Jan.28,2004.Available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/invasion/interviews/fallows.html
  
  
• Essential
  By A2DIAUZPNQ6I0G on 2006-07-31
  Just finished reading it -- great book!
  
  The author's analysis is objective & professional. Probably 50% of policy books today have some kind of serious bias, but I found Mr Pollack's assumptions to be fair & his conclusions to be well-reasoned. He seems to have a good command on different sociological, psychological, political and religious aspects of the Iranian society, and he presents his case without relying on guess work or unsubstainted/dishonest assertions.
  
  I do think, however, that Mr. Pollack should have included more material on the role of Sunni-Shiite tension within the Islamic world, and its effect on Iran's policies. In addition, the author could have focused more on the perceptions Muslims in other countries have about the US & Israel. After all, while devising a strategy for relations with Iran, it is imperative that such basic complexities are considered.
  
  
• 3.5 points
  By A10R81SKUK3TG6 on 2006-10-11
  Ever since I moved to the Middle East, I have been very interested in what is going on in the regional politics. I had some previous knowledge about post '53 Iran, but Mr. Pollack's writing showed me a different perspective. I will not discuss the political and historical issues in the book, as my fellow reviewers have already done that.
  
  5 points for the amount of information available, the details and the analysis. But I have to say that so many details and notes to the events become tiring at timest, difficult to remember them all. As a former CIA military analysit, Mr. Pollack did a great job by bringing to light so much information and detail. A well analyzed and reserached book.
  
  1 point for the author's attitude in some parts. Sometimes he emphasizes too much on how important and powerful the United States are, how much they don't need Iran, and what a great country America is. Nothing wrong with being proud of your country, and it might be true that the US do not care about Iran. But when one wants to write an unbiased, objective book on such a hot topic, personal feelings should not be there.
  
  4 1/2 points for the writing style - smooth and coherent, making it a very pleasant reading. I found myself sometimes in the situation where I could not put the book aside.
  
  Overall, The Persian Puzzle is a very good reading for those really interested in what Iran-US relations are like today and why they are they way they are. I recommed this book to those who already know something about this subject. If you want to learn now, this is not the good introduction. You might find it too heavy and difficult to digest so much information.
  
  It is definitely a reference book on the topic, rational, comprehensive, suitable for the average reader, worthwhile buying.
  
  
• Dammed Important
  By AYG0VZWJM5PJI on 2006-02-07
  The author makes a point that every administration since Carter has done everything they can to minimize or avoid Iran, and each time one has had to involve themselves with Iran, it was done only after an unexpected crisis occurrences. The result is that consistent and reasoned analysis of this mid-eastern country has been very difficult to find. The author, a well respected scholar from the Brookings Institute, sets out the geopolitical settings of 21st century Iran. As one of the few Shi'a republics with a convoluted and complicated political structure, this task is not easy. The author does a tremendous job of setting out the American policy, its supporting arguments, and indeed, even some of its missteps.
  
  It is easy for American news consumers to develop reactionary, sometimes flawed, theories about the current and developing circumstances in the middle east. The 24 hour news channels, and quick local news sound bites, feed into such atrocities. However, this makes reasoned analysis all the more important. An understanding of Iran is complicated by several factors. Sometimes the government acts against its own interest, sometimes it has acted in a way (begrudgingly) to support the US. It is important to understand why it has acted in the past in both these ways. The author does this by first developing a cursory review of the ancient development of the country (Zeroastianism and the fact the majority of the country consider themselves Persian rather than arab has been argued to be a factor in government decisions right through the 1980's perhaps even beyond), then he goes into more detail around the development occurring during the first part of the 20th century. The majority of the book correctly focuses on developments since WW2 and both the triumphs and tragedies of the American - Iranian relations.
  
  The authors keen insights provide a significant view into a difficult world, made more important by the fact that he has been influential in the present administration. He previous work, subtitled "The Case for Invading Iraq" is said to have converted some doves over to the invading side. It should also be noted that the final chapter of this book suggest approaches for developing a new policy with Iran, and one of the subtitles is "The Case Against Invading Iran." As the developing nuclear crisis in Iran continues, this book should be required reading for anyone who is interested in understanding the statements, subtleties, and grandstanding on both sides.
  
  
  
• Iran, Tormented Soul in Search of an Identity
  By A2RELWKFCZRB8G on 2006-06-06
  Kenneth Pollack first gives his readers an excellent introduction to the remarkable history of Iran from the rise of the Persian Empire to the reign of the Pahlavis (pp. 3-100). Pollack shows clearly how nationalist and xenophobic Iran got wary of meddling foreigners, starting with the hated Russians and Brits, in its domestic affairs (pp. 4, 41). Many Iranians have angry psychological scars, believing that foreigners are the source of all their problems for partially understandable reasons (pp. 26, 71, 89, 99, 125, 128, 155-56, 161, 173-74, 242, 297, 389).
  
  Pollack focuses the bulk of his book on a balanced account of the troubled American-Iranian relations in the last 50+ years. The U.S. started building its "satanic" reputation after the CIA played a key role in helping the Brits get rid of Iran's popular Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq in 1953 (pp. 57-67). Mosaddeq's "crime" was the "illegal" nationalization of the Iranian oil industry under control of the rapacious Brits (pp. 52-56). The U.S. did not improve its reputation among most Iranians by supporting the dictatorial Shah who largely mismanaged the modernization of Iran until his overthrow in 1979 (pp. xxv, 72-140).
  
  Pollack convincingly demonstrates that the Truman Administration and its successors usually did not exercise enough pressure on the Shah to democratize and liberalize Iran when they had the opportunity to do it (pp. 49, 76-77, 81, 89-90, 104, 121-24, 136-40). The Shah, who was ironically considered sold out to the West, became less and less amenable to the "omniscient" U.S., beginning in the mid-1960s (pp. 39, 50, 84, 94, 99-100, 107, 120-27, 158, 173).
  
  After the revolution of 1979, the U.S. mostly supported Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war and funded different destabilization operations to contain and try to overthrow the Islamic Republic (pp. 206-16, 259-65, 273-76, 386). The U.S. apologized in 2000 for some past misdeeds in an unsuccessful attempt to improve its relations with Teheran under the presidency of the moderate but ultimately ineffective Mohammad Kathami, who was under relentless pressure from the hard-liners (pp. xxv, 303-42).
  
  Pollack blames with equal conviction the Iranians for the awful relations existing between both countries. Iran has built its reputation of international pariah due to the illegal seizure of the U.S. embassy staff in 1979, its lack of democratic credentials, its support of terrorism around the world, its opposition to the Middle East peace process, and its pursuit of (nuclear) WMDs (pp. xxi, 141-80, 182, 198-201, 237-40, 248, 256-59, 266-67, 277, 345, 379-82). Pollack also explains to its readers that many Iranians have a poor understanding of the U.S. (pp. 50, 180, 309).
  
  Pollack does not hesitate to show repeatedly that greed has not stopped the international community, including the U.S. at times, from doing business with Iran in the last 25+ years (pp. 164-65, 262-65, 271-72, 286-89). Iran is trying without much success to emulate China by crushing internal dissent and favoring economic development (pp. xxiv, 250, 369-73, 390-91). The U.S. will be of no help in this endeavor as long as Iran stubbornly clings to its pursuit of acquiring nuclear military expertise on top of other objectionable actions (pp. 273, 312, 324, 351).
  
  Pollack tries to crack the Iranian enigma by rightly ruling out an invasion of Iran due to its size, population, and topography (pp. xxiii, 383-86). Pollack ultimately pleads for a three-pronged strategy that rests on an unconvincing mix of carrots and sticks (pp. 375-424).
  
  The U.S.-led international community seems to believe that Iran will "submit" to the "diktats" of foreigners in the nuclear crisis without undermining again the "legitimacy" of the hard-liners (pp. xxv-xxvi, 157, 251, 352, 365, 395-400). Hard-liners have not forgotten the humiliation of 1988 (pp. 227-33). Nuclear WMDs would shield Iran from further "humiliating" foreign interference (pp. 259, 361-69).
  
  The Shi'i hard-liners, inspired by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and co, relish martyrdom and heavy sacrifices (pp. 157, 177-79, 222-23, 302). Like most of his predecessors, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is seeking confrontation with the international community as a way of diverting Iranians' attention from their problems for which ideology is a poor solution (pp. 158, 238, 243, 293-96, 348, 369-74). Iranian hard-liners can find plenty of inspiration in the playbooks of Adolf Hitler and co.
  
  The U.S. will discover again at its own expense that key countries will balk at acting responsibly after Iran predictably fails to comply with the legitimate demands of the society of nations (pp. 165, 262). Iranian hard-liners consider weakness a defensive and reactive policy towards their offensive agenda (pp. 218, 234-35, 266, 300). Nothing meaningful will happen until the implementation of very comprehensive economic / financial sanctions and the credible threat of massive strategic bombardments against the nuclear and revolutionary power infrastructure across Iran (pp. 299, 301, 392-95). Iran has not been impressed with half-baked carrots like the Critical Dialogue and, with "Mini-Me" sticks such as Dual Containment and a few cruise missiles (pp. 265, 273-76, 283-84, 291, 337-38, 344, 391).
  
  There will be no free lunch (p. 385). Stepped-up war against (state-sponsored) terrorism will require a series of "patriotic" sacrifices to mitigate the inevitable, short-term sharp increase in energy prices. Furthermore, there will be a new spike in terrorist operations as a "payback" for muscular action against Iran (pp. 253, 345-49, 354-58, 373, 392).
  
  If Iran is not stopped before it acquires nuclear WMDs, it will indulge with a vengeance its own regional hegemonic aspirations not only in the Persian Gulf, but also in Central Asia (pp. 253-56). Energy prices will not go down in this scenario. Furthermore, Iranian hard-liners could consider Southern Russia and Chinese Xinjiang fair game for their revolutionary agenda due to the sub-optimal treatment of many Muslim minorities in these areas (pp. 198-205). Their military nuclear program is not purely defensive. Whoever ignores the past, will pay a heavy price down the road.
  
  
  
• Weak on the nuclear issue
  By A20OIUZLOWQU2 on 2006-06-21
  While Pollack admits that he doesn't speak Farsi etc, the weakest part of the books is on the nuclear issue. Some of his claims about the existence of a nuclear weapons program in Iran are fallacious & specious at best, and also totally disregard the economic legitimacy for Iran of having access to an independent nuclear power program.
  
  
• Excellent intro to Iran-America conflict
  By A26KSESH1KXU3Q on 2006-11-28
  Pollack does an excellent job of explaining, analyzing, and suggesting solutions to the long-simmering antagonism between the US and Iran. Pollack is one of the few writers on Iran to actually discuss the Persian psyche. Most writers on the subject give nothing more than a superficial analysis and try to explain the problem as being a result of Iranian anger over the coup against Mosadegh and the Shah's abuses tolerated by the US, while the US is shown as having a 25 year old grudge for the embassy seizure and anger over Iran's support of anti-Israeli groups/terrorists. Pollack goes far beyond that to explain why the Persians feel so insulted and threatened by the US's past and present behavior, their chauvinism/exaggerated importance in the world, and reasons for slow development, even decline in Iran's socioeconomic decline on many fronts. He looks at possible means of rapprochement between the two countries, and offers hope for better relations between America and Iran.
  
  
• Pure ignorance
  By A2FRKFZYFLTRKN on 2007-02-06
  If we ignore all logic, historical precedence, assume that all cultures think as we do and ignore the doctrines of Islam, this book makes sense.
  
  Unfortunately, the only people salivating over this book are the same who want to believe what should be true and not what is in reality, true.
  
  Mr. Pollack mistakenly believes that the leadership of Iran is rational and wants what American wants. This is false. And a gross false assumption.
  
  This culture he heralds is completely irrational and could care less about their economy. Someday, people who love Mr. Pollack's book and the author himself will understand that but when it's too late. (unfortunately for us who know)
  
  Instead of buying this book, buy a copy of the Koran (sp in other ways I know) and make sure it's not the PC version and you will know what you need to know. It's all there in their doctrines and they do not hide it. Only Mr. Pollack and the American media hide this brutal reality in an agenda driven attempt to equate all cultures. Respect for other cultures is understanding the reality of them including the good, the bad and the ugly. This one doesn't get uglier denying the holocaust happened among other things.
  
  Mr. Pollack's book naively glosses over reality and he is another lemming who writes books about what he "feels" is true, not what is true.
  
  
• Interesting US insider's account which at least does not call for war
  By A1S60W4KWFX1Y9 on 2007-12-12
  Kenneth Pollack is a member of the US state's National Security Council and a long-time CIA member. In his previous book, published in October 2002, he called for the invasion of Iraq. He now admits that the attack was "based on a case for war that turned out to be considerably weaker than was believed at the time." Iraq "was (mistakenly) believed to be close to acquiring nuclear weapons."
  
  In this fascinating book, he explores Iran's relations with first Britain and then the USA. He exposes British imperialism's profiteering in Iran: in 1950, Iran got only £57 million of the £275 million oil profits. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company paid its workers 50 cents a day, refused to observe Iran's labour laws, bribed officials and illegally interfered in Iran's elections.
  
  In 1950, the Attlee government planned to invade Iran with 70,000 troops, the CIA and MI6 covertly operated against the elected Mossadeq government, and together the CIA and MI6 organised the 1953 coup. After the coup, US oil firms moved into Iran, making AIOC worse off than if it had agreed to Iran's 1950 offer of a 50/50 split.
  
  Pollack writes, "After the coup ... Iranians increasingly believed that the United States was a malevolent power that had replaced the British as the insidious force controlling Iran's destiny and preventing it from achieving its rightful stature and prosperity. As usual, that myth is not right, but it is also not entirely wrong either. There is a kernel of truth in it, and therein lies the rub: the United States did help to overthrow Mossadeq, and it was culpable in the establishment of the despotism of Mohammed Reza Shah that succeeded him." So why call it a myth?
  
  Similarly, the CIA did organise SAVAK, the Shah's secret police, and the USA did give the Shah vast amounts of military aid. Pollack writes, "the Eisenhower administration tried hard to keep Iran at arm's length" yet in the next sentence notes how the CIA developed `a liaison relationship with SAVAK." He notes the US state's `assistance to SAVAK, and other pernicious policies', yet eight lines later writes that there is `no evidence that the United States directly aided SAVAK ... or even provided general advice and assistance'. He admits that the US state never did anything to stop SAVAK's mass systematic torture. He sums up, "Washington probably had too cozy a relationship with SAVAK and may have purposely ignored the stories of its terror and its tortures, but at most, the United States was an accomplice, not the inspiration." Probably? May have? And 26 years of state terrorism and tortures are just `stories'? And isn't an accomplice guilty of the crime?
  
  In September 1978, the day after the Shah's army, US-armed and US-trained, killed hundreds of people, President Carter called the Shah to express his support. This was part of "a coordinated campaign by the administration to demonstrate its support to the shah and convince him to deal more decisively with the crisis." On 28 December 1978, the US urged the Shah to appoint a `firm military government'.
  
  In January 1979, the US state tried "to convince the Iranian military to take over the country and snuff out the revolution, and to assist them in doing so." This, Pollack writes, was `more fodder to feed the conspiracy theories'. Not evidence, just `fodder'. And he admits, "this central element of their paranoid fantasies ultimately turned out to be very real", so not paranoid fantasies at all then.
  
  In the Iraqi war of aggression against Iran, the US state backed everything that Saddam Hussein did, even his chemical warfare. Pollack writes, "it was not so much a conscious decision to condone Iraq's use of chemical weapons against Iran, although some officials did do precisely that, as much as it was a general lack of interest in whatever horrible things were befalling the Iranians." Again, Pollack finds excuses for US state crimes, for who had sold Saddam Hussein the chemical weapons? Did the USA sell the weapons unconsciously?
  
  The US state frames its enemies as coercive, irrational, and aggressive and assumes that the USA is always peaceful, rational and defensive. So Pollack can write, "One can tick off America's problems with Iran on one hand: support for terrorism, pursuit of nuclear weapons, opposition to the Middle East peace process, undermining of regional stability, and a poor human rights record." So blind is his faith in US rectitude that he cannot see that the USA has done all the things of which he accuses Iran.
  
  Pollack reminds us of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's 2000 speech admitting, but not regretting, that the US state had backed the 1953 coup, the Shah's repression and Iraq's attack on Iran. She accused Iran - "control over the military, judiciary, courts and police remains in unelected hands." Aren't the US Defense Secretary and Attorney-General unelected political appointees? The US state and its servants judge other countries' practices, not against US practice, but against US ideals.
  
  Thankfully, Pollack has learnt enough from the Iraq disaster to oppose the idea of invading Iran - "an invasion of Iran has nothing to recommend it." He points out that Iran has not attacked the USA directly or indirectly since 1996. Iran's population is three times Iraq's, its geographical area four times Iraq's, making invasion militarily unfeasible. He also opposes the idea of attacking Iran's nuclear facilities, saying that even if Iran had nuclear weapons (which it hasn't - see the USA's latest National Intelligence Estimate), the best policy would be containment. And an invasion would have no international support, apart from the usual dependencies.
  
  
  
  
• Well researched but one thing (at least)
  By A22U7GRT3GI00Q on 2006-05-19
  The USA did not stop Saddam Hussein during his Anfal Campaign (which he dreadfully tried Kurdish genocide) due to the USA's own huge pacifist movement of the late 60's/early 70's which left the USA largely incapable of taking on the military of a nation even as strong as Iraq. Pollack would have done better to have remembered this as he coldly claims the USA didn't care much about the Iraqi Kurds. And we for sure discouraged Saddam about his beating on the Kurds. It was the Cold War and the Soviets would've encouraged Saddam to do even worse than he did on the Kurds.
  
  
• Sloppy research from a proven idealogue
  By A3BQTO14JA699W on 2008-01-12
  This is the same Kenneth Pollack who was a cheerleader for the Iraq war, then presented himself as a critic of the war to help sell the "surge?" That's all we need to know about his wisdom, foresight, and intellectual honesty. The book follows the same poor judgment and lack of intellectual vigor as his writings on Iraq.
  
  For one thing, as Jonathan Schwarz points out, Mr. Pollack could not figure out why the Iranians, after the Iran-Iraq war, wanted to defend themselves against the US by purchasing "mostly weaponry intended for naval warfare." This made Mr. Pollack realize that "Iran was a very different country from most others and that it was a country obsessed with the United States of America."
  
  Well, perhaps the obsession had to do with the fact that the US had overthrown Iran's secular, democratic government in the 50's. Maybe it was because the US had played both sides of the Iran-Iraq war against each other. Maybe it was because, as Barry Lando, author of 'Web of Deceit,' points out, during the Iran-Iraq war "heavily armed U.S. Special Operations helicopters...were ordered to the Persian Gulf. Their mission was to destroy any Iranian gunboats they could find." Maybe it was because, as Lieutenant Colonel Roger Charles, who was serving in the office of the secretary of defense at the time points out, plans were in place "for a secret war, with the U.S. on the side of Iraq against Iran..." Mr. Lando's 'Web of Deceit,' a book about neighboring Iraq, does a better job of explaining Iran than does Mr. Pollack's book.
  
  A little research by Mr. Pollack may have brought up these facts. But then, they would not fit with his preconceived notions. Stay away from this book and anything Mr. Pollack puts on paper. He's pushing a specific ideology and will not let facts get in his way.
  
  
• This Book Made Me Smarter
  By A3TM9ZDK9EHADN on 2008-07-02
  This book provides an in-depth accounting of the American-Iranian relationship. The book focuses very little on ancient Iranian history - instead picking up with the 1953 coup against Mossadeq, the Pahlavi shahs, the 1979 Revolution, and the US-Iranian issues that have stemmed from those incidents.
  
  After detailing the history, the author explains why President Clinton's effort to renew ties with Iran failed. He also explains in great detail the temporary end of Iran's reformist counterrevolution, which fizzled out when President Khatami failed to challenge the right-wing clerics in control of Iran in the late 1990s. He paints a troubling picture of anti-Americanism emanating from Iran - sometimes irrational, other times understandable. His major cause of concern is Iran's nuclear weapons program, which he thinks can be derailed only by a united world (USA, Europe, China, Russia, etc).
  
  The book basically runs through recent Iranian history and US-reactions. In the end, he advocates a particular policy (keep the Grand Bargain on the table, don't attack Iran, unite the world to stop its nuclear weapons program, etc).
  
  It is a great (yet long) book. This one is not for you if you can only stay with a book for 200 or 300 pages. But if you hang in, you will emerge smarter than you entered, as I did.
  
  

• All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror
• Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic
• The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future
• A Path Out of the Desert: A Grand Strategy for America in the Middle East
• Confronting Iran: The Failure of American Foreign Policy And the Next Great Crisis in the Middle East